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THE DISCHARGEABILITY OF DIVORCE
OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY
CODE: FIVE FAULTY PREMISES IN THE
APPLICATION OF SECTION 523(a)(5)
James H. Gold*
Section 523(a) of the Bankruptcy Code sets out certain ex-
ceptions to the Code's general policy of allowing a debtor to
discharge obligations which arose prior to the filing of the
debtor's bankruptcy petition. Among the exceptions to dis-
charge found in this part of the Code is section 523(a)(5) which
provides that alimony, maintenance, or support obligations
owed to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor cannot
be discharged in the bankruptcy proceeding. This Article chal-
lenges the validity of a number of principles frequently relied
on by courts in determining whether a particular divorce obli-
gation qualifles for the section 523(a)(5) exception to discharge.
The author suggests an approach which analyzes the divorce
obligation in relation to the needs and incomes of both the
debtor and the nondebtor spouse as they exist at the time of the
section 523(a)(5) trial.
ONE OF THE PRIMARY purposes of the Bankruptcy Code' is
to give honest debtors a fresh economic start.' To facilitate
that goal, most obligations which arose prior to the filing of a
debtor's bankruptcy petition are discharged in the bankruptcy.3
* Law Clerk to the Honorable A. Thomas Small, United States Bankruptcy Court
for the Eastern District of North Carolina; B.A., Grinnell College (1972); J.D., Wayne
State University (1979).
1. The Bankruptcy Code is contained in title 11 of the United States Code. Refer-
ences to statutory sections in this Article will be to sections of the Bankruptcy Code unless
otherwise indicated.
2. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934); Forsdick v. Turgeon, 812
F.2d 801, 802 (2d Cir. 1987); In re Campbell, 74 Bankr. 805, 808 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1987).
3. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 727, 1141(d), 1228, 1328 (1986 & Supp. 1988). Individual
debtors will most frequently file for relief under either chapter 7 or chapter 13 of the
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However, section 523(a) of the Bankruptcy Code furthers a num-
ber of other policy goals by excepting some debts from discharge."
One of the most significant exceptions is found in section
523(a)(5) which provides that debts to a spouse, former spouse, or
child of the debtor, for alimony, maintenance, or support, are not
dischargeable in bankruptcy.5
Section 523(a)(5) is a commonly invoked provision of the
Bankruptcy Code, no doubt because the number of divorces and
bankruptcies have increased in recent years6 and because marital
conflict and economic woes tend to go hand in hand. Section
523(a)(5) is also a frequently litigated provision because neither
Congress nor the courts have provided clear guidance as to what
constitutes alimony, maintenance, or support for purposes of sec-
tion 523(a)(5). Courts are most frequently called upon to deter-
mine whether a particular divorce obligation qualifies for the sec-
tion 523(a)(5) exception in three paradigmatic situations: 1) when
the obligation in the divorce decree or separation agreement re-
quires the debtor to hold the nondebtor spouse harmless on joint
marital obligations; 2) when the obligation is to pay a sum of
money, either in a lump sum or in installments, within a specified
time period which is unrelated to or unaffected by the remarriage
or death of the nondebtor spouse; and 3) when there has been a
significant change in either the financial needs or the incomes of
0
Bankruptcy Code. In a chapter 7 bankruptcy, the debtor's nonexempt assets are liquidated
and distributed pro rata to creditors in full satisfaction of debts qualifying for discharge.
Under chapter 13, the debtor typically makes monthly payments to a trustee for a period of
up to five years, which the trustee then distributes to creditors. The chapter 13 debtor's
debts which arose prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition will be discharged when the
payments are completed even though creditors have not been paid in full. A chapter 13
debtor is required to pay creditors at least as much as they would receive under chapter 7.
4. These exceptions include: § 523(a)(1)(debts for specified taxes), § 523(a)(2) &
(4) (debts incurred through fraud or larceny), § 523(a)(3)(debts not listed in the debtor's
bankruptcy petition unless the creditor had knowledge of the debtor's bankruptcy), §
523(a)(6)(debts for willful and malicious injuries), § 523(a)(7) (debts for governmental
fines), § 523(a)(8)(debts for educational loans), § 523(a)(9)(debts arising from the
debtor's drunk driving), and § 523(a)(10)(debts involved in a prior bankruptcy case of the
debtor).
5. Although all the exceptions to discharge found in § 523(a) are applicable in a
chapter 7 "liquidation" bankruptcy, the only exception to discharge under § 523(a) appli-
cable in a nonhardship chapter 13 "wage-earner" bankruptcy is for alimony, maintenance,
and support listed under § 523(a)(5). See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (1986).
6. Freeburger & Bowles, What Divorce Court Giveth, Bankruptcy Court Taketh
Away: A Review of the Dischargeability of Marital Support Obligations, 24 J. FAM. L.
587, 587 (1985-86).
7. See In re Brock, 58 Bankr. 797, 806 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1986).
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one or both of the parties subsequent to the divorce.
The public policy rationale for section 523(a)(5) is that a
debtor should be required to fulfill support obligations to hiss for-
mer spouse and children arising out of the broken marriage.9
However, this policy is not absolute. The fresh start policy must
still be considered. The legislative history of section 523(a)(5)
makes clear that Congress did not intend for all obligations of a
bankruptcy debtor arising out of a prior divorce decree to be non-
dischargeable.10 Section 523(a)(5) represents an attempt by Con-
gress to balance the competing policy considerations of providing
the debtor with a fresh start and of not allowing a debtor to neg-
lect his divorce obligations to his former spouse and children.",
It is the contention of this Article that many courts are tak-
ing an overly formalistic approach to section 523(a)(5) issues
when a more flexible, equitable approach is needed. These courts
rely on criteria which have little relevance to the question of
whether a divorce obligation is "in the nature of alimony, mainte-
nance, or support"'12 or refuse to consider other factors which are
pertinent to the analysis. As a result, in far too many cases courts
are not striking a proper balance between the competing policy
concerns addressed by section 523(a)(5). The rather striking re-
sults in two recent federal court decisions demonstrate that an
overly rigid application of section 523(a)(5) may create harsh
consequences for either the debtor or his former spouse.
8. In the overwhelming majority of cases arising under § 523(a)(5), the bankruptcy
debtor is a male who is seeking to discharge divorce obligations to his former wife. This
Article will therefore use masculine pronouns to describe the debtor spouse and feminine
pronouns to describe the nondebtor spouse. The principles discussed in this Article are, of
course, equally applicable in the more unusual situation in which the nondebtor spouse is
male. See, e.g., In re White, 55 Bankr. 878 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1985).
9. In Shaver v. Shaver, 736 F.2d 1314, 1316 n.3 (9th Cir. 1984), the Ninth Circuit
stated that the rationale for § 523(a)(5) is threefold: "the protection of the spouse who
may lack job skills or who may be incapable of working, the protection of minor children
who may be neglected if the custodial spouse entered the job market, and the protection of
society from an increased welfare burden that may result if debtors could avoid their famil-
ial responsibilities by filing for bankruptcy."
Other courts have read § 523(a)(5) more broadly so as to prevent the discharge of
divorce obligations that were intended to allow the debtor's former spouse and children to
maintain the standard of living to which they had become accustomed during the marriage.
See In re Goin, 808 F.2d 1391, 1393 (10th Cir. 1987); Boyle v. Donovan, 724 F.2d 681,
683 (8th Cir. 1984).
10. See infra notes 31-33, 45-47 and accompanying text.
11. In re Hoivik, 79 Bankr. 401, 402 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1987); In re Hysock, 75
Bankr. 113, 113 (Bankr. D. Del. 1987). See infra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
12. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)(B) (1986 & Supp. 1988).
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In In re Gebhardt,13 a 1981 divorce decree incorporated a
separation and property settlement agreement which required the
husband to pay $450 each month in maintenance and child sup-
port. The agreement also required the husband to pay his former
spouse $20,000 immediately and a total of $80,000 in annual in-
stallments over six years. When the husband filed his chapter 7
bankruptcy petition approximately one year after the divorce de-
cree, he attempted to discharge the $80,000 promissory note. The
bankruptcy court held in an unpublished opinion that the debtor's
obligation on the $80,000 promissory note was in the nature of
support and therefore nondischargeable because the obligation on
the note was intended to help the wife meet her monthly living
expenses. The court took into account the fact that, at the time of
the divorce, the debtor's wife was unemployed and suffering from
multiple sclerosis.
The district court reversed the bankruptcy court's decision.
The district court held that the evidence was clear that the parties
intended the $80,000 promissory note to be "part of the property
division and, therefore, . . . dischargeable." '14 In reaching this
conclusion, the court noted that the separation agreement had re-
quired the wife to quitclaim to the husband her interest in a farm
with a net value of approximately $200,000, which was twice the
value of the cash settlement not labeled support. It also empha-
sized the fact that there were other provisions for maintenance in
the divorce decree, and that the husband's obligation on the prom-
issory note did not terminate upon the death or remarriage of his
wife. The district court in Gebhardt held that the bankruptcy
court had erred in relying on the wife's poor physical health and
her need for present and future support in reaching its decision
when the language of the separation agreement showed that the
note represented a property division. The district court's opinion
did not discuss the debtor's ability to fulfill his obligation on the
$80,000 promissory note given as part of the separation agree-
ment. Thus, despite the debtor's former wife's unemployment and
multiple sclerosis, the debtor's obligation on the $80,000 note was
discharged, leaving only the $450 monthly maintenance and child
support obligation.'
13. 53 Bankr. 113 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
14. Id. at 115.
15. Id. at 115-16. There is no indication in the Gebhardt opinion as to how much the
debtor's former spouse would receive from the liquidation of the debtor's estate in satisfac-
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In In re Stone,"' a separation agreement entered into in 1983
after twenty-eight years of marriage required, among other things,
that the husband pay his wife $7,000 per month. The husband's
obligation to make these monthly payments would terminate upon
the remarriage of his wife or the death of either party. Both chil-
dren of the marriage were over eighteen years of age at the time
of the separation. Some time after the separation agreement was
executed, the debtor suffered what the bankruptcy court charac-
terized as "a severe financial setback."17 The value of some 34,000
shares of stock held by the debtor in his employer corporation fell
from twelve dollars to twenty-two cents a share. The debtor's op-
tion to purchase 120,000 shares of stock in his employer was ren-
dered worthless and his employment was terminated.
The debtor went into bankruptcy in 1986 and his former wife
instituted an adversary proceeding seeking a ruling that both past
and future payments due from the debtor's monthly obligations
under the separation agreement were nondischargeable pursuant
to section 523(a)(5). The bankruptcy court found, based primarily
on the debtor's net worth and income at the time of the separation
agreement and the former wife's lack of work experience during
the long marriage, that the parties had mutually intended the
monthly payments required by the separation agreement to be for
the wife's support. In holding that the debtor's monthly payment
obligations were nondischargeable, the bankruptcy court ruled
that changes in the financial circumstances of the parties subse-
quent to the entry of the separation agreement were irrelevant to
the resolution of the section 523(a)(5) issue. Therefore, the court
rejected the debtor's argument that, in view of his financial set-
back, his obligation to make the monthly payments should be dis-
charged to the extent that the payments exceeded his former
wife's present actual needs. The court in Stone was uninfluenced
by the fact that, prior to filing for bankruptcy, the debtor had
been denied a reduction of his monthly support obligations in state
court due to a provision in the separation agreement which pro-
hibited modification in state court. Thus, despite the debtor's fi-
nancial setback, he remained obligated to pay his former wife in
excess of $84,000 per year unless she remarried or until one of the
tion of the $80,000 note. Unsecured creditors often receive nothing or only a few cents on
the dollar under chapter 7.
16. 79 Bankr. 633 (Bankr. D. Md. 1987).
17. Id. at 634.
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parties died.
In reaching their respective holdings, the Gebhardt and Stone
courts relied on legal principles which have frequently been cited
in other recent decisions addressing section 523(a)(5). These hold-
ings, which in this writer's opinion are both harsh and unwar-
ranted,18 suggest that many of the legal principles used by courts
to resolve questions arising under section 523(a)(5) are poorly
reasoned or in need of refinement.
After briefly reviewing the history of the exception to dis-
charge for alimony, maintenance, and support obligations, this
Article will critique the following legal principles commonly em-
ployed by courts in determining section 523(a)(5) issues: 1) di-
vorce obligations representing divisions of marital property do not
qualify for the section 523(a)(5) exception to discharge; 2) the
crucial issue under section 523(a)(5) is whether the parties to a
divorce settlement or the court issuing the divorce decree intended
to create a support obligation; 3) a divorce obligation which does
not terminate upon the death or remarriage of the recipient spouse
is generally dischargeable in bankruptcy; 4) a debtor's assumption
of an obligation of the nondebtor spouse will not qualify for the
section 523(a)(5) exception if the underlying obligation was not
incurred to provide necessities for the nondebtor spouse; and 5)
changes in the financial circumstances of the parties after the di-
vorce decree was entered are not relevant under section 523(a)(5).
It is contended that all of these principles frustrate, rather
than further, the underlying purposes of section 523(a)(5) and
that none of them is mandated by the statutory language of that
section. Because any divorce obligation, if fulfilled, both contrib-
utes to the welfare of the debtor's former spouse and hinders the
debtor's fresh start, the form that a particular divorce obligation
takes (which is often the result of capricious factors) should not
be determinative of its dischargeability. This Article proposes an
approach which determines the dischargeablity of divorce obliga-
tions under section 523(a)(5) by focusing directly on the needs,
income levels, and earning potentials of the debtor and the
nondebtor spouse as they exist at the time of the section 523(a)(5)
trial. Although this proposed weighing of the parties' needs and
incomes provides no "bright line" test for determining the dis-
18. Although Gebhardt and Stone are extreme examples, there are many other deci-
sions under § 523(a)(5) cited within this Article which do not appear to strike an equitable
balance between the competing policy concerns behind that section.
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chargeability of divorce obligations, it better facilitates the strik-
ing of a proper balance between the competing policy considera-
tions underlying section 523(a)(5) than does an approach which
relies on the more formalistic and narrow criteria critiqued in this
Article.
I. HISTORY OF THE EXCEPTION TO DISCHARGE FOR ALIMONY,
MAINTENANCE, AND SUPPORT
Courts have been excepting from discharge a debtor's support
obligations to his former wife and his children since before the
turn of the century.19 Although the Bankruptcy Act of 189820 did
not explicitly set forth an exception to discharge for support obli-
gations, the United States Supreme Court held in a series of deci-
sions that such an exception was implied because payment of sup-
port obligations constituted a duty not subject to discharge, rather
than a dischargeable debt.21 The Supreme Court decisions holding
that support obligations were not dischargeable in bankruptcy rep-
resented the prevailing view at that time.22 The Court cited the
same policy considerations which are still relied upon today in
support of an exception to discharge for support obligations: "The
bankruptcy law should . . . not . . . deprive [a] dependent wife
and children of the support and maintenance due them from the
husband and father, which it has ever been the purpose of the law
to enforce."23
Congress followed the Supreme Court's lead and amended
section 17(a) of the Bankruptcy Act in 1903 to explicitly provide
for an exception to discharge for "alimony due or to become due,
19. See Note, Congressional Intent in Excepting Alimony, Maintenance, and Sup-
port from Discharge in Bankruptcy, 21 J. FAM. L. 525, 526 (1982-83).
20. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, repealed by Bankruptcy Act of
1978, ch. 11, § 523(a)(5), 92 Stat. 2549.
21. Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68 (1904); Dunbar v. Dunbar, 190 U.S. 340
(1903); Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U.S. 575 (1901). The duty/debt distinction drawn by
the Supreme Court in these cases is no longer relevant under the current Bankruptcy Code
which provides that all claims which arose prior to the filing of a bankruptcy petition are
subject to discharge unless specifically excepted. See Note, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978: Dischargeability of Obligations Incurred Under Property Settlements, Separation
Agreements, and Divorce Decrees, 12 U. BALT. L. RE. 520, 526 n.56 (1983). A "claim" is
broadly defined in the Bankruptcy Code as a "right to payment, whether or not such right
is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured,
disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured." 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) (1986).
22. See Shine v. Shine, 802 F.2d 583, 586 (lst Cir. 1986)(citing IA Collier on
Bankruptcy 1668-69 (14th ed. 1978)).
23. Wetmore, 196 U.S. at 77.
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or for maintenance or support of wife or child . . *"24 Thereaf-
ter, the courts were increasingly called upon to determine whether
a particular obligation arising out of a divorce constituted ali-
mony, maintenance, or support within the meaning of the Bank-
ruptcy Act.2" The Act, itself, did not provide a definition of these
terms. The courts attempted to define them by drawing a distinc-
tion between a husband's ongoing duty to support his former wife
and children and obligations which arose out of a division of mari-
tal property, with only the latter considered dischargeable in
bankruptcy.2 6 In determining whether an obligation constituted
nondischargeable alimony or a dischargeable property settlement,
some courts found the state law definition of alimony in the state
where the divorce decree was entered to be controlling, while
other courts focused on the substance of the obligation.27
Congress effected a major overhaul of the bankruptcy laws
24. Act of Feb. 5, 1903, ch. 487, 32 Stat. 797, 798.
25. Shine, 802 F.2d at 586.
26. Id. The rationale for the rule that divisions of marital property are subject to
discharge is based upon the distinction between a dischargeable debt and a nondischarge-
able duty enunciated by the Supreme Court in its decisions around the turn of the century
which established the discharge exception for support obligations. Obligations based upon
divisions of marital property were considered to be debts determined according to the law
of contract and therefore not covered by the statutory exception to discharge. In re Alcorn,
162 F. Supp. 206, 209 (N.D. Cal. 1958). As stated in Norris v. Norris, 324 F.2d 826, 828
(9th Cir. 1963)(bracketed citation contained in opinion):
It is well settled that "[a]limony does not arise from any business transaction,
but from the relation of marriage. It is not founded on contract, express or im-
plied, but on the natural and legal duty of the husband to support the wife,"
[Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U.S. 575, 577, 21 S. Ct. 735, 736, 45 L.Ed. 1009
(1901)] and it is the obligation based on this duty which is saved from discharge
in bankruptcy by Section 17, sub. a(2) of the Act. Wetmore v. Markoe, 196
U.S. 68, 76, 25 S. Ct. 172, 49 L.Ed. 390 (1904).
27. Note, supra note 21, at 524-26. It should be noted that prior to 1970 the dis-
chargeability of divorce obligations was usually determined in state court in a post-bank-
ruptcy action to enforce the obligation. See Swann, Dischargeability of Domestic Obliga-
tions in Bankruptcy, 43 TENN. L. REv. 231, 234 (1976). In 1970 the Bankruptcy Act was
amended to permit bankruptcy courts to determine the dischargeability of a debt before an
action had been brought in state court to enforce the obligation. Act of Oct. 19, 1970, Pub.
L. No. 91-467, 84 Stat. 990. Since that amendment, the dischargeability of divorce obliga-
tions has been determined more frequently in the bankruptcy courts. See Note, Discharge
of Post-Marital Support Obligations Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 4 HARV. WOMEN'S
L.J. 177, 180 n.24 (1981).
Currently, bankruptcy courts and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction to deter-
mine dischargeability under § 523(a)(5). See In re Brock, 58 Bankr. 797, 799 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1986). Yet, there are many more recently reported federal court decisions addressing
§ 523(a)(5) than there are state court decisions.
[Vol. 39:455
DISCHARGEABILITY OF DIVORCE OBLIGATIONS
when it enacted the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,8 which re-
placed the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. In attempting to modernize
the bankruptcy law,29 Congress considered implementing some
dramatic changes with respect to the dischargeability of support
obligations; however, it ultimately elected to make only relatively
minor changes in the statutory language excepting support obliga-
tions from discharge.3"
Among the reforms which Congress considered, but failed to
adopt, was a proposal by the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws
of the United States3l to eliminate the distinction that courts had
been drawing between alimony and property divisions by making
all obligations in connection with a separation agreement or di-
vorce decree nondischargeable. 32 The Commission took the view
that obligations arising from property divisions should not be dis-
chargeable because an obligation in the nature of family support
may frequently take the form of a division of marital property.33
The National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges also drafted
a proposed exception to discharge for support obligations which
was introduced in Congress. 4 However, this draft narrowed,
rather than expanded, the existing exception. The Judges' bill pre-
served the support/property settlement distinction by limiting its
proposed exception to alimony, maintenance, or support, but it
added the following proviso with respect to "hold harmless"
clauses: "Provided, however, That a debt shall not be excepted
from discharge hereunder merely to hold the spouse harmless on
28. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
29. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1977) (hereinafter HOUSE REPORT].
30. The exception to discharge under the Bankruptcy Code is a "substantial reen-
actment" of the statutory exception to discharge for alimony, maintenance, and support
under the Bankruptcy Act. In re Bell, 61 Bankr. 171, 173 n.1 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986).
One reform that was implemented by the Bankruptcy Code was to make the exception
available to both male and female nondebtor spouses. Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,
only support obligations for the debtor's wife or child were excepted from discharge.
31. The Commission was created by Congress in 1970 to recommend changes in the
bankruptcy laws. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 29, at 2. The Commission drafted H.R.
31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) and S. 236, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975).
32. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS, H.R. Doc. No. 137,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 4-506(a)(6), at 136 (1973), reprinted in 2 COLLIER ON BANK-
RUPTCY app. (15th ed. 1987).
33. Id. at 139.
34. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 29, at 2. The National Conference of Bank-
ruptcy Judges drafted H.R. 32, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975) and S. 235, 94th Cong., Ist
Sess. (1975) [hereinafter Judges' Bill].
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her obligation in any manner to pay the debt . . . ."5 One of the
members of the Conference explained that this language remedied
what the Conference perceived to be an abuse of the exception to
discharge by allowing the debtor to discharge debts shared with
his former spouse "where the beneficiary of the payments on such
obligations is not the wife but rather an unsecured creditor whose
debt would otherwise be dischargeable in bankruptcy." 6
Congress adopted neither of the significant reforms proposed
in the Commission's and the Judges' bills when it passed the new
Bankruptcy Code. The adopted exception to discharge is found in
section 523(a)(5) of the Code31 and currently reads as follows:
A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or
1328(b) of this title does not discharge an individual debtor
from any debt -
(5) to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for
alimony to, maintenance for, or support of such spouse or child,
in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree or
other order of a court of record, determination made in accor-
dance with State or territorial law by a governmental unit, or
property settlement agreement, but not to the extent that -
(A) such debt is assigned to another entity, voluntarily, by
operation of law, or otherwise (other than debts assigned pursu-
ant to section 402(a)(26) of the Social Security Act, or any such
debt which has been assigned to the Federal Government or to a
35. Judges' Bill, supra note 34, § 4-506(a)(6).
36. Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before the Subcommittee on Civil and Consti-
tutional Rights of the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1281 (1976) (prepared statement of
the Honorable Joe Lee, Bankruptcy Judge, Eastern District of Kentucky).
37. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1986 & Supp. 1988). The current version of § 523(a)(5)
differs little from the version which was enacted in 1978. In 1984 and 1986, § 523(a)(5)
was amended to render nondischargeable a support obligation created pursuant to an ad-
ministrative proceeding or a court order other than a divorce decree. Bankruptcy Judges,
United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554,
100 Stat. 3088; The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333. The primary purpose of these amendments was to extend the
protection of § 523(a)(5) to children born out of wedlock. See Mullaly v. Carter, 67 Bankr.
535 (N.D. I11. 1986); DuPhily v. DuPhily, 52 Bankr. 971 (D. Del. 1985); 132 CONG. REC.
H9002 (1986)(statement of Sen. Denton); 132 CONG. REC. H9002 (1986)(statement of
Rep. Hyde).
Section 523(a)(5) was also amended in 1981 and 1984 to add the parenthetical lan-
guage in § 523(a)(5)(A) which prevents the discharge of support obligations assigned to a
governmental unit. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, §
2334(b), 95 Stat. 357, 868; The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 454(b), 98 Stat. 333, 376. These are the only changes which
have been made to § 523(a)(5) since it was enacted.
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State or any political subdivision of such State); or
(B) such debt includes a liability designated as alimony,
maintenance, or support, unless such liability is actually in the
nature of alimony, maintenance, or support[.]
Some of the most significant language with respect to the dis-
chargeability of support obligations is found not in the text of sec-
tion 523(a)(5), but rather in statements contained in the legisla-
tive history of the 1978 Act. These statements have been used to
establish principles which are not readily apparent from the text
of section 523(a)(5).
The reports prepared by the House and Senate Judiciary
Committees to assist the members of Congress in their considera-
tion of the final version of the 1978 Act state that "[w]hat consti-
tutes alimony, maintenance, or support, will be determined under
the bankruptcy law, not State law." 8 Based on this legislative his-
tory, courts have held that an obligation could be in the nature of
support so as to be excepted from discharge under section
523(a)(5) even though the initial creation of the obligation had
not been required under state support law.39 While courts are now
virtually unanimous in accepting the principle that the determina-
tion of dischargeability under section 523(a)(5) is ultimately a
matter of federal law, it is frequently stated that principles of
state law with respect to alimony, maintenance and support may
be looked to for guidance in resolving issues arising under section
523(a)(5). " °
The Congressional reports also addressed the question raised
by the Judges' bill of whether a debtor's obligation to assume joint
marital debts and to hold his former spouse harmless on those
debts may be nondischargeable under section 523(a)(5). Although
the House and Senate reports contain the statement that section
523(a)(5) will only except from discharge support obligations
38. HousE REPORT, supra note 29, at 364; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 79
(1978) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT].
39. E.g., In re Yeates, 807 F.2d 874, 878 (10th Cir. 1986); In re Harrell, 754 F.2d
902, 905 (1Ith Cir. 1985)(debtor's obligation under a separation agreement to pay his
son's college expenses held to be nondischargeable support under § 523(a)(5) even though
the debtor was not required under state law to support his son past the age of majority);
Boyle v. Donovan, 724 F.2d 681, 683 (8th Cir. 1984); In re Brown, 74 Bankr. 968, 972-73
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1987); In re Grijalva, 72 Bankr. 334, 338 (S.D. W. Va. 1987).
40. E.g., In re Yeates, 807 F.2d 874 (10th Cir. 1986); In re Calhoun, 715 F.2d 1103
(6th Cir. 1983); In re Spong, 661 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1981); In re Snider, 62 Bankr. 382
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986).
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"owed directly to a spouse or dependent,""' the remainder of the
House and Senate reports make it clear that section 523(a)(5)
does apply to a debtor's obligations to hold a former spouse harm-
less on joint debts:
This provision will, however, make nondischargeable any debts
resulting from an agreement by the debtor to hold the debtor's
spouse harmless on joint debts, to the extent that the agreement
is in payment of alimony, maintenance, or support of the spouse,
as determined under bankruptcy law considerations that are
similar to considerations of whether a particular agreement to
pay money to a spouse is actually alimony or a property
settlement. 2
The prevailing view, based on this language, is that a debtor's ob-
ligation to pay his former spouse's debts to third parties can be
excepted from discharge under section 523(a)(5).43 Section
523(a)(5)(A), which states that a support obligation is not ex-
cepted from discharge if it has been "assigned to another entity,"
has been narrowly interpreted by courts to mean that there is no
assignment within the meaning of section 523(a)(5)(A) if the
nondebtor spouse is receiving a support benefit from the payment
or assumption of the debt."'
Beyond the clarifications contained in the House and Senate
reports, neither the text nor the legislative history of section
523(a)(5) provides much guidance for courts attempting to deter-
mine whether a particular debt constitutes alimony, maintenance,
or support so as to be nondischargeable. No definition of these
terms is provided by the text or legislative history of the Act.45
Perhaps the most significant message which can be gleaned from
the legislative history is that Congress intended for courts to at-
41. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 29, at 364 (emphasis added); SENATE REPORT,
supra note 38, at 79 (emphasis added).
42. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 29, at 364; SENATE REPORT, supra note 38, at 79.
The quoted language is taken from the House Report. The Senate Report contains virtu-
ally identical language, but there are slight variations which do not affect the meaning of
the passage.
43. Two of the more detailed discussions of this issue are found in In re Calhoun,
715 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir. 1983) and In re Spong, 661 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1981). See infra notes
121-22.
44. In re Williams, 703 F.2d 1055, 1057 n.3 (8th Cir. 1983); In re Spong, 661 F.2d
6, 10-11 (2d Cir. 1981); In re Troxell, 67 Bankr. 328, 330-31 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1986); In
re Rich, 40 Bankr. 92, 94 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984); Stranathan v. Stowell, 15 Bankr. 223,
225-26 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1981).
45. In re Yeates, 807 F.2d 874, 877 (10th Cir. 1986); In re Harke, 24 Bankr. 645,
647 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1982).
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tempt to balance the competing policies of providing a bankruptcy
debtor with a fresh start and insuring that familial support obliga-
tions are fulfilled. This conclusion is drawn from the fact that
Congress rejected both the proposal from the Commission on the
Bankruptcy Laws of the United States which would have elimi-
nated consideration of the "fresh start" policy as well as the pro-
posal of the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges which
would have substantially narrowed the types of support obligations
qualifying for the exception to discharge.46 Congress apparently
was unwilling to completely embrace one policy at the expense of
the other. Unfortunately, because section 523(a)(5) is silent as to
how the balance between these competing policies is to be struck,
the confusion and inconsistency which existed under the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1898 has persisted under the Bankruptcy Code.' 7
In deciding issues under section 523(a)(5), the courts recite a
litany of principles, many of which, if not particularly helpful or
always heeded, are at least fundamentally sound. These principles
include the following: "An obligation to a former spouse for ali-
mony, maintenance, or support for the spouse or child, in connec-
tion with a separation agreement or divorce decree is not dis-
chargeable in a bankruptcy proceeding if the debt is actually in
the nature of alimony, maintenance or support.' 48 "Whether a
debt is dischargeable [under section 523(a)(5)] is determined by
federal bankruptcy law, not by state law.' 4  "The Bankruptcy
Code requires the bankruptcy court. . . to determine the true na-
46. See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
47. See In re MacDonald, 69 Bankr. 259, 270-71 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986); Note, supra
note 21, at 526, 531.
48. In re Smith, 61 Bankr. 742, 745 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1986). Accord Forsdick v.
Turgeon, 812 F.2d 801, 802 (2d Cir. 1987); In re Yeates, 807 F.2d 874, 878 (10th Cir.
1986); Tilley v. Jessee, 789 F.2d 1074, 1077 (4th Cir. 1986); In re Harrell, 754 F.2d 902,
904 (11th Cir. 1985); Shaver v. Shaver, 736 F.2d 1314, 1314 (9th Cir. 1984); In re Cal-
houn, 715 F.2d 1103, 1107 (6th Cir. 1983); In re Nowac, 78 Bankr. 638, 638 (Bankr.
D.N.H. 1987); Moore v. Moore, 78 Bankr. 304, 304 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1987); In re Freyer,
71 Bankr. 912, 916 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987); In re Soval, 71 Bankr. 690, 692 (Bankr. E.D.
Mo. 1987); In re Pitzen, 73 Bankr. 10, 11 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986).
49. In re Phillips, 80 Bankr. 484, 486 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987). Accord In re Yeates,
807 F.2d 874, 877 (10th Cir. 1986); In re Long, 794 F.2d 928, 930 (4th Cir. 1986); In re
Harrell, 754 F.2d 902, 905 (11th Cir. 1985); Shaver v. Shaver, 736 F.2d 1314, 1316 (9th
Cir. 1984); In re Calhoun, 715 F.2d 1103, 1107 (6th Cir. 1983); In re Williams, 703 F.2d
1055, 1056 (8th Cir. 1983); In re Hoivik, 79 Bankr. 401, 402 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1987); In
re Brown, 74 Bankr. 968, 971 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1987); In re Campbell, 74 Bankr. 805, 809
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1987); In re Young, 72 Bankr. 450, 452 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1987); In re
Freyer, 71 Bankr. 912, 916 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987); In re Soval, 71 Bankr. 690, 692
(Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1987); In re MacDonald, 69 Bankr. 259, 267 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986).
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ture of the debt, regardless of the characterization placed on it by
the parties' agreement or the state court proceeding." 5 "Dis-
chargeability must be determined by the substance of the liability
rather than its form."51 "IT] he burden of proof is on the party
asserting that a debt is non-dischargeable. This is as it should be,
since every debt which a debtor must continue to bear impedes his
ability to make good on the fresh start which the Bankruptcy
Code provides him." 2
A number of other frequently cited principles are either
faulty in premise or, at the least, unduly susceptible to misinter-
pretation and misapplication. A critique of these faulty premises
follows.
II. FAULTY PREMISES
A. Faulty Premise #1: "[O]bligations created by property
settlements are divisions of property and are dischargeable in
bankruptcy. 53
Courts applying section 523(a)(5) have repeatedly stated,
without offering elaboration or justification, that divorce obliga-
tions based on divisions of marital property are dischargeable in
bankruptcy, while support obligations are not dischargeable. 51 The
50. In re Benich, 811 F.2d 943, 945 (5th Cir. 1987). Accord In re Goin, 808 F.2d
1391, 1392 (10th Cir. 1987); Shaver v. Shaver, 736 F.2d 1314, 1316 (9th Cir. 1984); In re
Williams, 703 F.2d 1055, 1057 (8th Cir. 1983); Roberts v. Poole, 80 Bankr. 81, 85 (N.D.
Tex. 1987); Moore v. Moore, 78 Bankr. 304, 305 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1987); In re Campbell,
74 Bankr. 805, 809 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1987); In re Cockhill, 72 Bankr. 339, 341 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1987); In re Young, 72 Bankr. 450, 452 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1987); In re Mizen, 72
Bankr. 251, 253 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987); In re Soval, 71 Bankr. 690, 692 (Bankr. E.D.
Mo. 1987).
51. In re Snider, 62 Bankr. 382, 384 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986). Accord Shaver v.
Shaver, 736 F.2d 1314, 1316 (9th Cir. 1984); In re Spong, 661 F.2d 6, 9 (2d Cir. 1981); In
re Phillips, 80 Bankr. 484, 486 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987); In re Hoivik, 79 Bankr. 401, 402
(Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1987); In re Brown, 74 Bankr. 968, 971 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1987); In re
Meadows, 75 Bankr. 695, 697 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987); In re MacDonald, 69 Bankr. 259,
267 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986).
52. In re Barac, 62 Bankr. 713, 717 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1985). Accord In re Benich,
811 F.2d 943, 945 (5th Cir. 1987); In re Long, 794 F.2d 928, 930 (4th Cir. 1986); In re
Calhoun, 715 F.2d 1103, 1111 (6th Cir. 1983); Roberts v. Poole, 80 Bankr. 81, 85 (N.D.
Tex. 1981); In re Hoivik, 79 Bankr. 401, 402 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1987); In re Campbell,
74 Bankr. 805, 808 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1987); In re Freyer, 71 Bankr. 912, 916 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1987); In re Pitzen, 73 Bankr. 10, 12 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986).
53. In re Bell, 61 Bankr. 171, 174 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986).
54. E.g., In re Long, 794 F.2d 928, 931 (4th Cir. 1986); In re Coil, 680 F.2d 1170,
1171 (7th Cir. 1982); In re Grijalva, 72 Bankr. 334, 336 (S.D. W. Va. 1987); In re Freyer,
71 Bankr. 912, 916 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987); In re MacDonald, 69 Bankr. 259, 268
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courts have erroneously viewed these two types of divorce obliga-
tions as mutually exclusive, resulting in a number of decisions
which frustrate the policy of requiring debtors to fulfill obligations
in the nature of support.
The theoretical distinction between a support obligation and
a property settlement can be easily stated. Alimony, maintenance,
and support are based upon a spouse's continuing legal duty to
provide for the needs of his former spouse and children after a
divorce, while the purpose of a property division is to unscramble
the ownership of marital property in an equitable fashion.5 De-
spite this theoretical distinction, however, the purposes and func-
tions of property divisions and support obligations tend to over-
lap.56 Although the laws of each state vary, support obligations
are generally determined by considering the length of the mar-
riage, the needs and income levels and potentials of each spouse,
and the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage.5 7 Courts
will attempt to divide marital property in a manner which is just
or equitable58 by considering the source of the property in ques-
tion and the contributions of each spouse to the marriage.59 In
dividing marital property, many courts will also consider the same
factors which are traditionally relied upon in establishing support
obligations.6 0 More significantly, it is apparent that, in both di-
(Bankr. D.N.J. 1986); In re Norton, 65 Bankr. 140, 142 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1986); In re
Barac, 62 Bankr. 713, 716 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1985). See also cases cited infra notes 64-65
& 70.
55. In re Brown, 74 Bankr. 968, 972 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1987); 2 H. CLARK, THE
LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, § 16.1, at 181 (2d Practitioner's ed.
1987).
56. 2 H. CLARK, supra note 55, at 181-82.
57. Id. § 17.5, at 257-64, 271-72. See, e.g., Jones v. Jones, 463 So. 2d 564, 569 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1985); In re Marriage of Estlund, 344 N.W.2d 276, 281 (Iowa Ct. App.
1983); Grubert v. Grubert, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 811, 818-19, 483 N.E.2d 100, 105 (1985);
Ellsworth v. Ellsworth, 97 N.M. 133, 134-35, 637 P.2d 564, 565 (N.M. 1981); Pacella v.
Pacella, 342 Pa. Super. 178, 184-85, 492 A.2d 707, 711 (1985).
58. 2 H. CLARK, supra note 55, § 16.3, at 190-91 (most statutes authorizing division
of property on divorce direct courts to consider certain factors; in addition they often con-
tain a general requirement that the division be "equitable" or "just").
59. Id. at 192-93.
60. Id. § 16.1, at 181-82 (the courts find it difficult to distinguish property from
support obligations when community property or marital property is divided, thus the fac-
tors normally used to calibrate a spouse's support obligation might be used to divide the
marital property). See also id. § 16.3, at 192-93 (giving the factors commonly used to
divide marital property). E.g., Carpenter v. Carpenter, 188 Conn. 736, 741, 453 A.2d
1151, 1154 (1982); In re Marriage of De Bat, 127 Ill. App. 3d 463, 468-69, 468 N.E.2d
1348, 1353 (1984); Gottschalk v. Gottschalk, 107 Mich. App. 716, 309 N.W.2d 711
(1981).
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vorce settlements and court imposed decrees, the division of mari-
tal assets and obligations will often result in the reduction or elim-
ination of a support obligation which would otherwise be
required.6 1
For example, one divorcing couple might have few significant
marital assets, but needs and earning capacities which would war-
rant a support obligation to the wife of $12,000 per year. Another
couple might have identical needs and earning capacities, but also
own a family business which the husband wishes to retain. The
husband in the second hypothetical might agree or be required to
issue a promissory note for $150,000, payable over ten years, as
compensation for the wife's share of the business, but, in view of
that property settlement, be relieved of any obligation to pay ali-
mony. The $15,000 annual payments on the note in the second
hypothetical and the $12,000 yearly support payments in the first
hypothetical, where there was no property division, would serve
the same function - meeting the support needs of the spouse.
Similarly, a divorce settlement or decree may require one
spouse to pay $24,000 per year alimony while the recipient spouse
is required to assume $25,000 of joint marital debts. The same
parties might instead agree or be required to set the alimony level
at $19,000 for the first five years (before being increased to
$24,000), but with the spouse paying the alimony also being re-
quired to assume and hold the other spouse harmless on the joint
marital debts. Without an intervening bankruptcy, the needs of
the recipient spouse would be equally satisfied under either
61. See 2 H. CLARK, supra note 55, § 17.5, at 262-63 (alimony will probably be
reduced or eliminated where the property award is "ample" for the spouse's needs). The
following cases all indicate that property awarded as part of a division of marital assets is a
factor to be considered in determining what, if any, support will be awarded: Deatherage v.
Deatherage, 140 Ariz. 317, 681 P.2d 469 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984); Hackett v. Hackett, 278
Ark. 82, 643 S.W.2d 560 (Ark. 1982); Woodard v. Woodard, 477 So. 2d 631 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1985); Le Vine v. Spickelmier, 109 Idaho 341, 707 P.2d 452 (Idaho 1985); In re
Marriage of Shafer, 122 II. App. 3d 991, 462 N.E.2d 39 (1984); In re Marriage of Griffin,
356 N.W.2d 606 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984); Duplantis v. Duplantis, 470 So. 2d 480 (La. Ct.
App. 1985); Campolattaro v. Campolattaro, 65 Md. App. 68, 502 A.2d 1068 (1986); Fer-
nandez v. Fernandez, 373 N.W.2d 636 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); Hemphill v. Hemphill, 710
S.W.2d 438 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Pacht v. Jadd, 13 Ohio App. 3d 363, 469 N.E.2d 918
(1983); Johnson v. Johnson, 674 P.2d 539 (Okla. 1983); In re Marriage of Olinger, 75 Or.
App. 351, 707 P.2d 64 (1985); Pacella v. Pacella, 342 Pa. Super. 178, 492 A.2d 707
(1985); Sattari v. Sattari, 503 A.2d 125 (R.I. 1986); Johnson v. Johnson, 288 S.C. 270,
341 S.E.2d 811 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986); Cole v. Cole, 384 N.W.2d 312 (S.D. 1986); Weiss v.
Weiss, 122 Wis. 2d 688, 365 N.W.2d 608 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985); Smith v. Smith, 704 P.2d
1319 (Wyo. 1985).
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arrangement.
At the time alimony is established and property divided, the
parties will often be less concerned with differentiating between
the two types of obligations than with the "bottom line" question
of the total each spouse is to receive or give up.62 Whether a par-
ticular obligation takes the form of a property division or alimony
will often be the result of capricious factors such as the amount of
marital assets and obligations to be divided and the drafting style
of the lawyer preparing the settlement agreement or of the court
issuing the divorce decree.6 3 The form of a divorce obligation will
often bear no relationship to whether that obligation is actually
serving a support function.
There is nothing inherently wrong with divorce settlements
and decrees blurring the distinction between support obligations
and property divisions. In fact, the two appear to be unavoidably
interrelated. The problem arises when courts applying section
523(a)(5) fail to recognize the connection. A number of courts
have held that a debtor's unfulfilled obligation to his former
spouse was dischargeable because it constituted a "property settle-
ment," without discussing the parties' financial needs and earning
capacities or by disregarding such evidence.64 This can result in
62. See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
63. Sometimes the form of a divorce obligation will have been influenced by income
tax considerations. Alimony payments have traditionally been deductible by the spouse
making the payments and taxable to the recipient spouse, while payments representing a
division of marital assets did not receive such treatment. 2 H. CLARK, supra note 55, §
16.1, at 180. Some courts have been influenced by the manner in which the parties had
treated a divorce obligation for tax purposes prior to bankruptcy in determining whether
that obligation is dischargeable or nondischargeable. E.g., Beiler v. Beiler, 80 Bankr. 63, 64
(E.D. Va. 1987); In re Bell, 61 Bankr. 171, 175 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986). However, be-
cause "parties sometimes treat payments under a divorce settlement as one thing for tax
purposes, while the true purpose is something else," In re Goodman, 55 Bankr. 32, 36
(Bankr. D.S.C. 1985), the better view is for courts deciding § 523(a)(5) issues to attach
little significance to the tax treatment given to the obligation by the parties. See Roberts v.
Poole, 80 Bankr. 81 (N.D. Tex. 1987); In re Singer, 18 Bankr. 782 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1982), aff'd, 787 F.2d 1033 (6th Cir. 1986).
Divorce settlements entered into after 1984 are less likely to be influenced by tax
considerations because of changes in the federal income tax laws enacted that year. See 2
H. CLARK, supra note 55, § 17.9, at 321-45.
64. E.g., Roberts v. Poole, 80 Bankr. 81, 84 (N.D. Tex. 1987)(debtor's obligation to
pay his former wife $3,000 a month for a period of ten years held to constitute a discharge-
able division of marital property; needs of the parties not considered in making this deter-
mination); In re Brown, 74 Bankr. 968, 972-73 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1987)(debtor's obligation
under separation agreement to pay $50,000 over six years "as part of the division of prop-
erty" held to be dischargeable property settlement despite evidence that at the time of the
divorce the debtor's income was between $40,000 and $50,000 while the nondebtor spouse's
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the arbitrary discharge of obligations needed for support, in con-
travention of the underlying purposes of section 523(a)(5).
Some courts adhere so strongly to the property settlement/
alimony distinction that they have held that an obligation taking
the form of a property division is dischargeable even when the
divorce settlement indicates that the property division is being
made in lieu of alimony or in consideration of the wife's waiver of
her right to alimony. 5 Such language clearly suggests that the
property division is a substitute for traditional alimony payments,
and the financial condition of the parties will often support the
income was approximately $16,000); In re Mallisk, 64 Bankr. 39, 42 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1986)(debtor's obligation to pay his former spouse approximately $50,000 over a ten year
period held to be dischargeable property settlement because the payments were intended to
compensate the nondebtor spouse for the release of her interest in the marital property; no
discussion of the needs of the parties); In re Jackson, 59 Bankr. 77, 78 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1986) ($20,000 awarded to wife to compensate her for her interest in the marital property
held to be a dischargeable property settlement without discussion of the needs of the par-
ties); In re Delaine, 56 Bankr. 460, 469-70 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1985)(debtor's obligation to
pay indebtedness secured by residence awarded to nondebtor spouse held to be a discharge-
able property settlement despite evidence that the nondebtor spouse was working for mini-
mum wage and that payment of the indebtedness was necessary for her support); In re
Gebhardt, 53 Bankr. 113, 115 (W.D. Mo. 1985)(discussed supra notes 13-15 and accom-
panying text). See also cases cited infra notes 65, 92 & 101.
65. E.g., Beiler v. Beiler, 80 Bankr. 63 (E.D. Va. 1987)(debtor's obligation in sepa-
ration agreement to pay his former spouse $5,000 over two years held to be dischargeable
based on evidence that there had been a waiver of alimony; no discussion of needs of par-
ties); In re Wadleigh, 68 Bankr. 499 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1986)(debtor's obligation to pay his
former spouse's legal fees arising from the divorce held to be dischargeable because the
former spouse agreed to waive alimony in exchange for a better property settlement); In re
McVay, 57 Bankr. 432 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1985)(provision in separation agreement re-
quiring husband to assume second mortgage on home awarded to wife held to be discharge-
able without discussion of wife's needs based on language in agreement that no alimony
would be paid); In re Hudgens, 57 Bankr. 184 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1986)(debtor's obligation
to assume a second mortgage of $8,000 was dischargeable when the obligation was as-
sumed in exchange for the nondebtor spouse's agreement not to seek alimony despite evi-
dence that the nondebtor spouse was earning $924 a month and supporting four children at
the time of the separation); In re Talley, 57 Bankr. 75 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1985)(debtor's
obligation to pay his former wife $10,000 within nine months of the divorce decree held
dischargeable based on waiver of maintenance contained in decree despite evidence that the
wife had been unemployed for many years at the time of the divorce, was unable to support
herself, and needed the $10,000 for her support); see also In re Brown, 74 Bankr. 968
(discussed supra note 64)(court relies on fact that separation agreement states that "wife
makes no demand or claim for alimony" in holding obligation contained in agreement to be
dischargeable despite large disparity of income between the parties).
Other courts have found that a divorce obligation created in lieu of alimony was in the
nature of support so as to be nondischargeable under § 523(a)(5). E.g., In re Yeates, 807
F.2d 874 (10th Cir. 1986); In re Lightner, 77 Bankr. 274 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1987); In re
Young, 72 Bankr. 450 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1987); In re Horton, 69 Bankr. 42 (Bankr. E.D. Mo.
1986).
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conclusion that the obligation arising from the property division is
needed to provide for the support of the nondebtor spouse."
A court decision that a property division obligation given in
exchange for a waiver of alimony is dischargeable may have par-
ticularly harsh consequences because the nondebtor spouse may be
precluded by the waiver language of the settlement agreement
from later seeking an upward modification of the divorce obliga-
tion in state court. The property division provisions of a divorce
decree are generally not subject to alteration under state law, but,
absent a waiver, all states will permit a divorced spouse to petition
for modification of traditional support obligations based upon
changed circumstances.67 Many states, however, will not allow an
upward modification of alimony if the agreement expressly limits
or precludes modification." Thus, a spouse who negotiates or liti-
gates a division of marital assets (or debts) based on a careful
assessment of her budget can potentially be permanently deprived
by a bankruptcy filing of the benefits needed for her support if she
agreed to waive support in exchange for the property division.
Even if the nondebtor spouse is able to obtain a state court grant
or increase of support following the bankruptcy discharge of a
"property settlement" obligation despite waiver language in the
separation agreement, the time and expense of this additional liti-
gation is a substantial detriment to the nondebtor spouse. 9
Some courts, while citing with approval the principle that
section 523(a)(5) does not except property settlements from dis-
charge, have implicitly recognized the injustice of discharging an
obligation needed for support merely because the obligation repre-
sents a division of marital assets or debts. These courts will disre-
gard the form of an obligation and determine its dischargeability
under section 523(a)(5) based on an assessment of the needs of
the parties.70 While such an approach usually leads to a just result
66. See supra note 65.
67. 2 H. CLARK, supra note 55, § 16.1, at 179 (alimony awards are generally modifi-
able while division of property is not).
68. Id., § 19.13, at 462. "[C]ontractual waivers of spousal support generally are en-
forceable . . ." Scheible, Defining "Support" Under Bankruptcy Law: Revitalization of
the "Necessaries" Doctrine, 41 VAND. L. REv. 1, 15 (1988). See also deMontluzin v.
deMontluzin, 464 So. 2d 948 (La. Ct. App. 1985).
69. In discharging a divorce obligation because it constitutes a property settlement,
many bankruptcy courts will console the nondebtor spouse by suggesting that she return to
state court to seek an increase in alimony. E.g., In re Nowac, 78 Bankr. 638 (Bankr.
D.N.H. 1987); In re Winders, 60 Bankr. 746 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986).
70. In re Benich, 811 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1987); In re Yeates, 807 F.2d 874 (10th
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in the case in which it is employed, it does not adequately chal-
lenge the holdings of those courts which have taken a more rigid
view of the rule that obligations arising from property settlements
are dischargeable in bankruptcy.
Direct repudiation of this misguided principle should lead to
a reduction in the number of decisions in which an obligation serv-
ing a support function is arbitrarily discharged merely because it
can be categorized as a property division. One of the strongest
criticisms of the traditional rule is found within a recent Sixth
Circuit decision - In re Singer."1 Unfortunately, this criticism
only appears in a concurring opinion. Judge Guy, concurring with
a finding of nondischargeability, quoted with approval the follow-
ing language from a prior bankruptcy court decision:
"While the parties have cast the argument before us, and it is
common in these controversies to do so, as whether certain prop-
erty ...was awarded as alimony or as property settlement,
such a characterization is not particularly constructive ....
The two terms are not. . . mutually exclusive. Under the law of
Ohio the parties may, upon a divorce, agree to how they will
divide up their property, and such an award of property to a
spouse may be regarded as alimony." 2
The majority opinion in Singer is not as straightforward in criti-
cizing the support/property division dichotomy as the concurring
opinion. The majority stated that an obligation which is "strictly"
a property settlement is dischargeable, but that a "property settle-
ment in connection with alimony, maintenance, or support" is
not.73 The majority went on to state, citing a Ninth Circuit opin-
ion,74 that if a settlement agreement fails to explicitly provide for
support, a "so-called property settlement" will be presumed to be
intended for support and excepted from discharge when circum-
stances indicate that the nondebtor spouse is in need of support. 5
Although this statement is valid as far as it goes, it fails to take
Cir. 1986); Shaver v. Shaver, 736 F.2d 1314 (9th Cir. 1984); Boyle v. Donovan, 724 F.2d
681 (8th Cir. 1984); In re Lightner, 77 Bankr. 274 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1987); In re Pitzen,
73 Bankr. 10 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986); In re MacDonald, 69 Bankr. 259 (Bankr. D.N.J.
1986); In re Markizer, 66 Bankr. 1014 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1986); In re Anderson, 62 Bankr.
448 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986); In re Bell, 61 Bankr. 171 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986).
71. 787 F.2d 1033, 1035 (6th Cir. 1986).
72. Id. at 1037 (concurring opinion)(quoting In re Hill, 26 Bankr. 156, 159 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1983)).
73. Singer, 787 F.2d at 1034.
74. Shaver v. Shaver, 736 F.2d 1314 (9th Cir. 1984).
75. Singer, 787 F.2d at 1035.
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into account the situation in which a traditional support obligation
had been set at a reduced amount (but not eliminated) in the ex-
pectation that a related property division obligation would be sat-
isfied and would contribute to the support needs of the nondebtor
spouse. 6 While Singer represents a step in the right direction, it
apparently has not led many other courts to reexamine their
thinking since neither the majority nor concurring opinion has
been frequently cited for its analysis of the support/property set-
tlement distinction."
As noted previously, the legislative history of section
523(a)(5) demonstrates that Congress did not intend that all obli-
gations arising from a division of marital assets and debts be non-
dischargeable. 8 In a number of cases, the discharge of such obli-
gations would appear to be appropriate.7 9 It is also clear, however,
that Congress' desire to provide protection for a debtor's former
spouse and children is poorly served by completely excluding from
the coverage of section 523(a)(5) any obligation arising from a
division of marital property. There is nothing in the language of
the statute which mandates such an arbitrary approach.80 Any
debt arising from a divorce, regardless of whether it is based upon
a division of marital assets or a traditional support obligation,
76. See, e.g., Tilley v. Jessee, 789 F.2d 1074 (4th Cir. 1986)(discussed infra note
104).
77. Only two bankruptcy courts have cited the Singer majority opinion with respect
to the dischargeability of property settlements. In re Leupp, 73 Bankr. 33, 35 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1987); In re Markizer, 66 Bankr. 1014, 1018 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1986). Neither the
concurring opinion in Singer nor the lower court opinion in Hill which it quoted has been
cited by any other court for their discussion on this point.
78. See supra notes 31-33, 45-47 and accompanying text.
79. E.g., In re Ammirato, 74 Bankr. 605, 607 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1987)(debtor's obli-
gation pursuant to separation agreement to hold his former spouse harmless on joint mari-
tal debts held to be dischargeable where nondebtor spouse had a significantly larger salary
than the debtor and the nondebtor spouse acknowledged that she did not know where the
debtor would get the money to pay off the joint debts); In re Markizer, 66 Bankr. 1014,
1019 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1986)(debtor's obligation to pay his former spouse $600 per week
for approximately nine years for her share of the family business held to be dischargeable
when the nondebtor spouse had already received over $370,000 in other cash and property
pursuant to the divorce agreement, the family business could not be sold for the anticipated
sales price of $600,000, and the debtor had offered to give the entire business to his former
spouse prior to filing for bankruptcy).
80. The House and Senate Reports on § 523(a)(5) are confusing since they seem to
draw a distinction between alimony and property settlements while simultaneously clarify-
ing that "hold harmless" obligations (which constitute a type of property settlement since
they involve a division of marital liabilities) can be nondischargeable. See supra note 42
and accompanying text. The underlying purposes of § 523(a)(5), however, argue in favor
of applying that section to property divisions which serve a support function.
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should be excepted from discharge if it is in the nature of ali-
mony, maintenance, or support."1 The purposes underlying section
523(a)(5) would be furthered if courts would explicitly recognize
this principle and renounce the premise that property settlements
do not qualify for the section 523(a)(5) exception and are there-
fore dischargeable in bankruptcy.
B. Faulty Premise #2: "The crucial issue [under section
523(a)(5)] is the function the award was intended to serve. "'82
Many courts, in addition to or instead of articulating a sup-
port/property division distinction, will state that a decisive issue
under section 523(a)(5) is whether the obligation was intended by
the parties or by the court issuing the divorce decree to serve a
support function.83 This approach can lead to sound results when
courts attempt to determine "constructive intent"' 4 by analyzing
the obligation in relation to the needs and incomes of the parties.85
Because this approach allows for the possibility that an obligation
based on a division of marital assets and debts could have been
created with the intent that it serve a support function, it is mark-
edly superior to the view that divisions of marital property and
support obligations are mutually exclusive.8
An intent test, however, is also subject to misapplication.
81. Setting forth an appropriate and effective test for determining whether a debt is
in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support is not an easy task, but will be attempted
later in this Article.
82. In re Snider, 62 Bankr. 382, 384 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986)(citing In re Williams,
703 F.2d 1055, 1057 (8th Cir. 1983)).
83. E.g., In re Yeates, 807 F.2d 874, 878 (10th Cir. 1986); In re Long, 794 F.2d
928, 931 (4th Cir. 1986); Boyle v. Donovan, 724 F.2d 681, 683 (8th Cir. 1984); In re
Calhoun, 715 F.2d 1103, 1109 (6th Cir. 1983); Roberts v. Poole, 80 Bankr. 81, 85-86
(N.D. Tex. 1987); In re Cockhill, 72 Bankr. 339, 341 (Bankr. N.D. I11. 1987); In re
Young, 72 Bankr. 450, 452-53 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1987); In re Freyer, 71 Bankr. 912, 919
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987); In re MacDonald, 69 Bankr. 259, 268 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986). See
also cases cited infra notes 85, 92 & 101.
84. In re MacDonald, 69 Bankr. 259, 268 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986)(quoting In re Allo-
way, 37 Bankr. 420, 425 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984)).
85. See, e.g., In re Hysock, 75 Bankr. 113 (Bankr. D. Del. 1987); In re Leupp, 73
Bankr. 33 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987); In re Anderson, 62 Bankr. 448 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1986); In re Myers, 61 Bankr. 891 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986); In re Bell, 61 Bankr. 171
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986).
86. It should be noted that a test governed solely by the intent of the parties or the
divorce court at the time of the divorce precludes a consideration of changes in the finan-
cial circumstances of the parties subsequent to the divorce. Whether such changes should
be considered in resolving § 523(a)(5) issues is discussed infra at notes 133-56 and accom-
panying text.
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Some courts have taken a narrow view of intent by requiring sub-
jective evidence of a mutual intent to create a support obligation
or by refusing to examine extrinsic evidence of the parties' needs
and incomes when the obligation in question was labelled a "prop-
erty division" in the divorce settlement or decree.8 Requiring ex-
plicit evidence of intent makes little sense in view of the arbitrary
manner in which the form of most divorce obligations is deter-
mined. Rather than attempting to ascertain the subjective intent
of the parties, courts applying section 523(a)(5) should make an
independent determination of whether the obligation at issue is, in
fact, serving a support function.
The inappropriateness of a narrowly construed intent test is
illustrated rather ironically in In re Helm,88 where the court was
called upon to determine the dischargeability of a debtor's divorce
obligation to pay his former spouse $1,000 a month for approxi-
mately twelve years unless she died or remarried first. The court
initially made the following observation:
[T]he parties to a divorce are rarely interested in the legal char-
acterizations given to obligations created by a divorce settlement
or decree. In the words of a sister Bankruptcy Court: "Few are
the cases where either party knows or cares whether it [the
debt] is alimony, support or [a] division of property. Each is
interested only in what each will get or have to pay."8
In the very next paragraph, the court held that the $1,000
monthly payments could not be excepted from discharge under
section 523(a)(5) because:
[The nondebtor spouse] has failed to prove that she and [the
debtor] intended the "periodic maintenance" payments to be ali-
mony or support. The evidence showed that while she may have
regarded the payments as alimony, he saw the payments as
nothing more than a method of transferring property which car-
ried with it substantial tax and economic advantages.90
The Helm court thus held that the failure to show a mutual intent
to create a support obligation was dispositive, and that it was not
necessary to consider whether the obligation actually had the ef-
87. See infra notes 88-92, 97-101 and accompanying text.
88. 48 Bankr. 215 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985).
89. Id. at 221 (quoting In re Jenkins, 32 Bankr. 978, 982 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983)).
See also In re MacDonald, 69 Bankr. 259, 268 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986)(quoting In re Allo-
way, 37 Bankr. 420, 425 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984)).
90. Helm, 48 Bankr. at 221 (emphasis in original).
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fect of meeting the nondebtor spouse's support needs."1 Other
courts have followed this reasoning. 92
If the parties to a divorce are, as acknowledged by the Helm
court, often indifferent and ignorant with respect to the legal
characterizations given to obligations arising from a divorce, then
their intent regarding those characterizations often will not be a
reliable indicator of whether an obligation is actually in the nature
of support. Therefore, intent should not be the dispositive factor in
determining whether an obligation to a former spouse is dis-
chargeable in bankruptcy. The purposes of section 523(a)(5) are
better served by examining the obligation in relation to the needs
and incomes of the former spouses. The Fifth Circuit adopted this
approach in In re Benich93 when it held that a debtor's obligation
under a "property settlement agreement" 94 to pay his former wife
$400 per month until her death or remarriage was in the nature of
support under section 523(a)(5). The court of appeals focused on
evidence that the wife had not worked during the eighteen year
marriage and had no occupational training. The court rejected the
debtor's argument that his uncontradicted testimony95 that he had
never intended to agree to pay support was controlling: "While
the intention of the parties is the ultimate question, even the un-
contradicted testimony of one of the spouses is not decisive."96
However, neither Benich nor any other recently published opinion
has directly criticized Helm or the other cases which have decided
section 523(a)(5) issues based on a failure to show mutual intent.
The intent quagmire is particularly acute when the obligation
in question appears under a "property division" heading in the di-
vorce settlement or decree. Courts then are especially unwilling to
91. Id. at 221, 224. In holding that it was unnecessary to consider whether the obli-
gation was actually serving a support function, the Helm court relied on the Sixth Circuit's
opinion in In re Calhoun, 715 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir. 1983), which holds that no further
inquiry is required if there was no intent to create a support obligation. See infra note 162.
The Calhoun intent test is criticized in Scheible, supra note 68, at 51.
92. Tilley v. Jessee, 789 F.2d 1074 (4th Cir. 1986)(although nondebtor spouse's in-
tention that a support obligation be created was demonstrated, the failure to show a
"shared intent of both parties" to create a support obligation rendered the debt dischargea-
ble despite evidence of the nondebtor spouse's poor health; the parties' financial circum-
stances at the time of the divorce held to be irrelevant); Beiler v. Beiler, 80 Bankr. 63
(E.D. Va. 1987)(follows Tilley in holding that the lack of a demonstrated mutual intent to
create a support obligation was dispositive without considering the needs of the parties).
93. 811 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1987).
94. Id. at 944.
95. The debtor's former spouse did not testify.
96. Benich, 811 F.2d at 945.
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consider the actual needs and incomes of the parties. For instance,
the Tenth Circuit in the recent decision of In re Yeates stated:
A written agreement between the parties is persuasive evidence
of intent. Thus, if the agreement between the parties clearly
shows that the parties intended the debt to reflect either support
or a property settlement, then that characterization will nor-
mally control. On the other hand, if the agreement is ambigu-
ous, then the court must determine the parties' intentions by
looking to extrinsic evidence."'
The Tenth Circuit held that the agreement in question was am-
biguous because it did not clearly segregate alimony and property
settlement provisions. 8 The court therefore considered evidence of
the nondebtor spouse's financial needs in affirming the district
court's holding that the debtor's agreement to assume a joint mar-
ital debt of $6,000 was in the nature of support so as to be
nondischargeable.
Although the Tenth Circuit in Yeates characterized the
nondebtor spouse's need for support as "a very important factor in
determining the intent of the parties,"99 the opinion clearly sug-
gests that evidence of such need will be given little or no consider-
ation if the obligation in question appears under a "property divi-
sion" heading. 100 This narrow intent test, which other courts have
appeared to follow in determining whether divorce obligations are
dischargeable, 101 is nothing more than an application of the rigid
97. In re Yeates, 807 F.2d 874, 878 (10th Cir. 1986)(citations omitted).
98. Id. at 878-79.
99. Id. at 879.
100. Id. at 878.
101. Tilley v. Jessee, 789 F.2d 1074 (4th Cir. 1986)(separate headings in separation
agreement for alimony and property settlement held to constitute substantial evidence that
the obligation under the property settlement heading was not intended for support); Beiler
v. Beiler, 80 Bankr. 63 (E.D. Va. 1987); In re Gebhardt, 53 Bankr. 113 (W.D. Mo. 1985);
In re Hoivik, 79 Bankr. 401 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1987); In re Nowac, 78 Bankr. 638
(Bankr. D.N.H. 1987); In re Brown, 74 Bankr. 968 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1987); In re Freyer,
71 Bankr. 912 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987); In re Lineberry, 55 Bankr. 510, 514 (Bankr. W.D.
Ky. 1985)("It has been the experience of this court in addressing issues under Section
523(a)(5), that the outcome is totally dependent on the definition given the state court
provisions purporting to award certain property or monetary sums.").
Other courts have been willing to look past a property settlement label to hold that the
parties intended to create a support obligation based on evidence of the needs and incomes
of the respective parties. E.g., In re Williams, 703 F.2d 1055, 1057 (8th Cir. 1983); In re
Coil, 680 F.2d 1170, 1171-72 (7th Cir. 1982); In re MacDonald, 69 Bankr. 259, 261-62,
277 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986).
Courts have also been required to determine the dischargeability of divorce obligations
clearly designated as support. Some have attached great significance to the support label.
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rule that divisions of marital property and obligations in the na-
ture of support are mutually exclusive in any case in which the
obligation was labelled a property division in the divorce decree or
settlement.
As discussed previously, a divorce obligation which represents
a division of marital property may also have been intended to
serve a support function. 02 The fact that the parties to a divorce
settlement or the court which issued a divorce decree'0 3 specifi-
cally employed a property settlement label does not demonstrate
that the obligation was not intended for support. This is so even
when there are separate property settlement and support headings
in the agreement or decree since the support function of the prop-
erty division may have been considered in determining the amount
of traditional support which would be provided.'04
E.g., In re Long, 794 F.2d 928 (4th Cir. 1986); In re Graves, 69 Bankr. 626 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 1987). Others have looked at additional evidence to determine that the debt was not
actually in the nature of support and was therefore dischargeable. E.g., Roberts v. Poole,
80 Bankr. 81 (N.D. Tex. 1987); In re Phillips, 80 Bankr. 484 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987).
This author believes that all divorce obligations should be examined in relation to the
needs and incomes of the parties to determine if they are actually in the nature of support
under § 523(a)(5), even those clearly labeled support. See infra notes 164-67 and accom-
panying text.
102. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
103. Some courts have indicated a greater reluctance to disregard support and prop-
erty division labels when they have been judicially created by the trier of fact after a
contested hearing than when the labels were the product of a settlement agreement be-
tween the parties. "In cases where it is clear that the state court has clearly and carefully
considered the question of support in the context of a contested case . . . then it is ex-
tremely unlikely that a bankruptcy court would make a contrary finding as to the true
nature of the support obligation." In re Lineberry, 55 Bankr. 510, 516 (Bankr. W.D. Ky.
1985)(quoting In re Helm, 48 Bankr. 215, 220 n.13 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985))(emphasis in
Helm.) See also In re Long, 794 F.2d 928 (4th Cir. 1986); In re Nowac, 78 Bankr. 638
(Bankr. D.N.H. 1987). However, in view of the effect that a property division might have
on the amount of support awarded in a contested proceeding, see supra notes 61-62 and
accompanying text, there should be no greater weight attached to judically created labels,
at least when the obligatiorr in issue appears under a property division heading. A divorce
obligation labeled as support by a state court in a contested proceeding should also be
subject to scrutiny under the federal standard of § 523(a)(5). See infra notes 164-67 and
accompanying text. "Code section 523(a)(5) makes no distinction between an obligation
which arises from an agreement of the parties and one which is ordered in the first instance
by a court." In re Brown, 74 Bankr. 968, 971-72 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1987).
A provision in a divorce decree entered prior to bankruptcy specifically stating that a
particular obligation is or is not to be dischargeable in bankruptcy should be given no res
judicata or collateral estoppel effect because the determination of the federal issue is not
essential to the state court divorce action. In re Aurre, 60 Bankr. 621, 624 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1986). See also In re Helm, 48 Bankr. 215, 219-20 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985).
104. But see Tilley v. Jessee, 789 F.2d 1074 (4th Cir. 1986), in which the nondebtor
spouse testified that a $1,000 per month support obligation was insufficient to meet her
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Section 523(a)(5) provides an exception to discharge for
debts for alimony, maintenance, or support; it does not limit the
exception to debts which the parties or the divorce court intended
to be for alimony, maintenance, or support. Courts called upon to
determine the dischargeability of an obligation under section
523(a)(5) should focus directly on the function of the obligation
by examining evidence of the needs and incomes of the parties
involved. They should not endeavor to indirectly determine the na-
ture of a divorce obligation by attempting to divine the intent of
the parties or the divorce court. This is especially important since,
at the time of the divorce, the focus of the parties and the divorce
court is likely to be on state law, rather than on the separate fed-
eral bankruptcy law which controls on the question of the dis-
chargeability of an obligation arising from a divorce.
C. Faulty Premise #3: "In order to constitute a non-
dischargeable debt [under section 523(a)(5)], a key test is
whether or not the obligation terminates on the death or
remarriage of a spouse."'05
Courts addressing issues arising under section 523(a)(5) fre-
quently state that the fact that a divorce obligation does not ter-
minate upon the death or remarriage of the recipient spouse indi-
cates that the obligation is not in the nature of support and is
therefore subject to discharge.' 06 Consideration of this factor is
partly based on the assumption that because a spouse's need for
support ends upon her death, and presumably upon her remar-
riage, an obligation which does not cease upon the occurrence of
these events was not created to serve a support function. 0 7 In ad-
support needs in view of her poor health and that the fulfillment of the debtor's obligation
to make installment payments on a $125,000 note, as required under the property division
section of the separation agreement, was also necessary for her support. The Fourth Circuit
held the obligation on the promissory note to be dischargeable, based in large part on the
fact that that obligation appeared under the property division section of the separation
agreement, rather than the alimony section.
105. In re Tosti, 62 Bankr. 131, 134 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986).
106. E.g., Shaver v. Shaver, 736 F.2d 1314, 1316 (9th Cir. 1984); In re Hysock, 75
Bankr. 113, 114 (Bankr. D. Del. 1987); In re Campbell, 74 Bankr. 805, 810 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1987); In re Ammirato, 74 Bankr. 605, 608 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1987); In re Freyer, 71
Bankr. 912, 917 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987); In re Markizer, 66 Bankr. 1014, 1018-19
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1986); In re Gibson, 61 Bankr. 997, 999 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1986); In re
Smith, 61 Bankr. 742, 746 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1986); In re Ramey, 59 Bankr. 527, 530-31
(Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1986). See also cases cited infra note 110.
107. See, e.g., In re Campbell, 74 Bankr. 805, 810 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1987); In re
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dition, courts which adhere to a rigid distinction between support
obligations and divisions of marital property will often rely on this
factor to identify dischargeable property settlements' °8 since tradi-
tional monthly support obligations terminate upon the recipient
spouse's death or remarriage, while obligations arising from divi-
sions of marital property do not. 09 Courts which have held di-
vorce obligations to be dischargeable without discussing the needs
of the parties or by disregarding such evidence have justified their
holdings by pointing to the noncontingent nature of the
obligation."'
A provision in a divorce decree or settlement specifying that
an obligation is to terminate upon the death or remarriage of the
recipient spouse strongly suggests that the obligation was intended
for support and there are almost no recent holdings that such con-
tingent obligations are dischargeable."' Unfortunately, courts
have too often failed to recognize that the converse is not true.
The fact that an obligation is to continue even if the recipient
spouse dies or remarries has little bearing on the question of
whether that obligation is serving a support function. As noted
previously, a noncontingent obligation based upon a division of
marital property may be created with the expectation that the ob-
ligation will provide for the needs of the spouses and thereby sup-
plement or replace the traditional support obligation."" Therefore,
an obligation may be based upon the nondebtor spouse's noncon-
Freyer, 71 Bankr. 912, 917 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987); In re Mallisk, 64 Bankr. 39, 42
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986).
108. Roberts v. Poole, 80 Bankr. 81, 84 (N.D. Tex. 1987); In re Phillips, 80 Bankr.
484, 486 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987); In re Brown, 74 Bankr. 968, 972 (Bankr. D. Conn.
1987); In re Campbell, 74 Bankr. 805, 810 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1987).
109. 2 H. CLARK, supra note 55, § 16.1, at 179. See also Shaver v. Shaver, 736 F.2d
1314, 1316 (9th Cir. 1984); In re Myers, 61 Bankr. 891, 894-95 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986).
110. E.g., Roberts v. Poole, 80 Bankr. 81, 84 (N.D. Tex. 1987); Beiler v. Beiler, 80
Bankr. 63, 64 (E.D. Va. 1987); In re Gebhardt, 53 Bankr. 113, 115 (W.D. Mo. 1985); In
re Brown, 74 Bankr. 968, 972 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1987); In re Mallisk, 64 Bankr. 39, 42
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986); In re Goodman, 55 Bankr. 32, 35 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1985).
111. But see In re Grijalva, 72 Bankr. 334 (S.D. W. Va. 1987), where the court held
that the debtor's obligation to make monthly mortgage payments of $420 on the residence
awarded to his former wife was a dischargeable property settlement despite the fact that
the obligation would terminate upon the death or remarriage of the nondebtor spouse. The
court relied on the fact that this obligation was not contained in the alimony and child
support section of the separation agreement which provided $1,900 per month for the
debtor's spouse and three children; the debtor in this case was a physician while his former
wife spoke English poorly and had had no meaningful work experience since moving to the
United States.
112. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
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tingent right to her share of the marital estate and, at the same
time, be needed to provide for her support.
Although it has been stated that a divorce obligation which is
to be paid in a fixed amount over a fixed period of time is indica-
tive of a debt which is not "support" for purposes of section
523(a)(5),113 there are a number of reasons why an obligation for
support might be created for a limited period of time. The spouse
might be awarded support for a specified period to enable her to
complete her education, 1 4 to obtain employment,1 5 to pay off a
mortgage or other debts,"16 or to remain in the marital home until
the children are grown. 1 7 The fact that the parties to a divorce
settlement or the divorce court neglected to provide that an obli-
gation which is already of limited duration is to terminate upon
the death or remarriage of the recipient spouse should be given
little weight in determining whether that obligation constitutes
support so as to be nondischargeable under section 523(a)(5).
A number of courts have properly disregarded the noncontin-
gent nature of a divorce obligation and excepted it from discharge
under section 523(a)(5) by focusing on the needs and incomes of
the parties.1 8 However, these decisions have rarely criticized the
notion that a divorce obligation which does not terminate upon the
death or remarriage of the recipient spouse will generally be dis-
chargeable. In fact, some have instead cited this proposition with
apparent approval." 9 As long as the flawed premise remains es-
sentially intact, the danger of future courts following it remains.
113. In re Goodman, 55 Bankr. 32, 35 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1985). See also In re Ramey,
59 Bankr. 527 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1987), in which the court, in holding that the debtor's
obligation to a assume a debt payable in thirty-six monthly installments was dischargeable,
emphasized the short term and noncontingent nature of the obligation.
114. In re Nowac, 78 Bankr. 638, 638 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1987); In re Anderson, 62
Bankr. 448, 451 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986).
115. Forsdick v. Turgeon, 812 F.2d 801, 803 (2d Cir. 1987); In re Rowles, 66 Bankr.
628, 629 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986); In re Bell, 61 Bankr. 171, 175 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
1986).
116. In re Myers, 61 Bankr. 891, 895 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986).
117. In re Cox, 68 Bankr. 307 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1986).
118. E.g., Forsdick v. Turgeon, 812 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1987); In re Goin, 808 F.2d
1391 (10th Cir. 1987); In re Horton, 69 Bankr. 42 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1987); In re Myers,
61 Bankr. 891 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986); In re Bell, 61 Bankr. 171 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986).
119. E.g., In re Goin, 808 F.2d at 1393; In re Horton, 69 Bankr. at 44; In re Bell, 61
Bankr. at 175.
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D. Faulty Premise #4: "Factors considered by bankruptcy
courts in ascertaining the true nature of [a "hold harmless"
obligation under section 523(a)(5)] include: (1) the nature of
the obligation assumed (whether for necessaries or
luxuries) .... "120
The general rule is that an obligation to indemnify and hold a
former spouse harmless on joint marital debts can be nondis-
chargeable under section 523(a)(5). 2 1 Most courts will determine
the dischargeability of a debt assumption obligation by focusing
on whether payment of the assumed debt is necessary for the
nondebtor spouse's support.1 21 Some courts, however, state that a
significant factor in determining the dischargeability of a "hold
harmless" obligation is whether the underlying debt was incurred
in order to obtain goods or services necessary for the nondebtor
spouse's support.123 The absence of such a purpose in the underly-
ing debt has been held by some courts to be "determinative"124 of
the dischargeability of the debtor's indemnification obligation
without regard to the needs and incomes of the parties. 25
The policy goals of section 523(a)(5) are not advanced by
this emphasis on the nature of the assumed obligation. Even when
the original debt was not incurred to provide necessities, it may
still be essential for the debtor to fulfill his obligation to assume
that debt in order for his former spouse's support needs to be met.
For instance, in In re Erler126 a divorce settlement required the
husband to pay support of $300 per month. The husband testified
120. In re Young, 72 Bankr. 450, 452-53 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1987).
121. In re Calhoun, 715 F.2d 1103, 1107 (6th Cir. 1983); In re Coil, 680 F.2d 1170,
1171 (7th Cir. 1982); In re Spong, 661 F.2d 6, 11 (2d Cir. 1981); In re Galpin, 66 Bankr.
127, 130 n.1 (N.D. Ga. 1985); In re Young, 72 Bankr. 450, 452 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1987); In
re Freyer, 71 Bankr. 912, 916 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987); In re Tosti, 62 Bankr. 131, 132-33
(Bankr. D.N.J. 1986); In re Anderson, 62 Bankr. 448, 456 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986); see
also cases cited infra note 122.
122. E.g., In re Yeates, 807 F.2d 874 (10th Cir. 1986); In re Williams, 703 F.2d
1055 (8th Cir. 1983); In re Lightner, 77 Bankr. 274 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1983); In re Mac-
Donald, 69 Bankr. 259 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986).
123. Moore v. Moore, 78 Bankr. 304, 305 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1987); In re Campbell,
74 Bankr. 805, 810 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1987); In re Freyer, 71 Bankr. 912, 918 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1987); In re Anderson, 62 Bankr. 448, 455 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986). See also
cases cited infra notes 124-25.
124. In re Shimp, 59 Bankr. 553, 555 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986).
125. Id.; In re Costell, 75 Bankr. 348, 356-57 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987); In re Cover-
dale, 65 Bankr. 126, 129 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1986); In re Erler, 60 Bankr. 220, 222 (Bankr.
W.D. Ky. 1986).
126. 60 Bankr. 220 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1986).
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that he and his estranged wife had determined that this figure was
sufficient to enable the wife to meet her living needs and those of
their children. The agreement specified that this amount was
predicated on, among other things, the husband's agreement to
assume all debts arising during the marriage. One of the debts
referred to in the "hold harmless" agreement was for 1981 taxes.
The bankruptcy court held that the debtor's bankruptcy dis-
charged his obligation to indemnify his wife for a contingent lia-
bility in an as yet unknown amount on the couple's joint 1981 tax
return. In reaching this holding, the court focused "in particular"
on the fact that a tax liability was not in the "nature" of "daily
necessities. ' 127 By discharging the debtor's assumption of the con-
tingent tax liability, the court left the nondebtor spouse vulnerable
to a potential tax judgment which could negate all or a substantial
portion of the $300 monthly support payments which had been
carefully calculated to provide for the nondebtor spouse's support
needs.
Other courts have held that section 523(a)(5) does not except
from discharge "hold harmless" obligations if the underlying joint
debt assumed was for goods which were awarded to the debtor in
the divorce128 or was for "personal" expenses incurred by the
debtor and his "girl friend. ' 129 Although goods which have been
awarded to the debtor are likely to be subject to repossession, 30 a
deficiency debt may remain and the nondebtor spouse's ability to
provide for herself will be impaired if she is required to use sup-
port payments to pay that deficiency.131 Furthermore, if the per-
127. Id. at 222. The Erler court also took the position that the assumption of the tax
liability could not have been in the nature of support because, at the time of the divorce
settlement, the amount of that liability was unknown. The court's reasoning is faulty be-
cause the parties apparently determined that the estranged wife's support needs would be
met if she received $300 per month and if she would not be held responsible for any mari-
tal debts. Under these circumstances, the husband's assumption of all marital debts would
be insuring that his wife's support needs would be met even if the exact amount of the
assumed debt was uncertain.
128. In re Coverdale, 65 Bankr. at 129; In re Shimp, 59 Bankr. at 555.
129. In re Costell, 75 Bankr. at 356.
130. See In re Calhoun, 715 F.2d 1103, 1109 (6th Cir. 1983).
131. It has been suggested that hold harmless obligations should not be excepted
from discharge because the nondebtor spouse has the option of seeking the discharge of the
underlying debt by filing for bankruptcy herself. In re Delaine, 56 Bankr. 460, 464 (Bankr.
N.D. Ala. 1985); Lee, Case Comment, 50 AM. BANKR. L.J. 175, 178 (1976). If the
nondebtor spouse is left with no alternative but to file for bankruptcy, she is likely to face
the loss of property (in chapter 7) or income (in chapter 13) which she had been counting
on to meet her support needs. There may be circumstances in which a couple's finances
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sonal expenses of the debtor and his girl friend were for goods or
services not subject to repossession such as restaurant or hotel
bills, the impact of the discharge of the debtor's "hold harmless"
obligation will be even greater.
It is clear that hold harmless obligations can serve a support
function even when the assumed debt had not been incurred to
provide necessities for the nondebtor spouse. The dischargeability
of any debt assumption obligation should be determined in the
same manner as any other divorce obligation - by examining the
obligation in relation to the needs and incomes of the parties. The
results under section 523(a)(5) when a debtor had assumed joint
marital debts should be no different than if the nondebtor spouse
had assumed those debts with a correspondingly higher support
award to cover the cost of the debt assumption.
Again, although a number of courts have applied section
523(a)(5) to except debt assumption obligations from discharge
without regard to the nature of the underlying debt, they have
done so without criticizing those courts which have improperly
considered this factor."3 2
E. Faulty Premise #5: "Bankruptcy courts may only consider
circumstances existing at the time of dissolution and 'not the
present situation of the parties' [in resolving issues under
section 523(a)(5)]." 1Sa
The Sixth Circuit in In re Calhoun'" held that changes in
were in such a precarious state prior to a divorce that a hold harmless obligation should not
be considered to be in the nature of support and the nondebtor spouse should be left to file
her own bankruptcy petition if she so chooses. See infra note 163. However, the availability
of bankruptcy relief for the nondebtor spouse should not preclude excepting a debt assump-
tion obligation from discharge when it would not impose an undue hardship on the debtor
to require that obligation to be fulfilled.
132. E.g., In re Lightner, 77 Bankr. 274, 277 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1987). See In re
MacDonald, 69 Bankr. 259, 266-67 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986); In re Horton, 69 Bankr. 42, 44
(Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1986).
133. In re Neely, 59 Bankr. 189, 193 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1986)(quoting Boyle v. Dono-
van, 724 F.2d 681, 683 (8th Cir. 1984)).
134. 715 F.2d 1103, 1109, 1111 n.l 1 (6th Cir. 1983). Although Calhoun only in-
volved and specifically addressed the dischargeability of a debtor's obligation to assume
joint marital debts, its analysis has been held to be applicable in all cases arising under §
523(a)(5). See In re Singer, 787 F.2d 1033, 1038 n.2 (6th Cir. 1986) (concurring opinion);
In re Helm, 48 Bankr. 215, 220 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985); In re Wesley, 36 Bankr. 526,
529 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983). Contra In re Deatherage, 55 Bankr. 268, 271 n.3 (Bankr.
E.D. Tenn. 1985)(Calhoun analysis is not to be applied to obligations which are clearly in
the nature of support such as standard child support payments and modifiable periodic
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the financial situation of both the debtor and the nondebtor spouse
occurring between the time of the divorce and the section
523(a)(5) trial may be taken into consideration in determining the
dischargeability of divorce obligations. This approach is correct.
Thus, courts in the Sixth Circuit and other courts following Cal-
houn will, in finding a divorce obligation to be dischargeable, take
notice of changes in the nondebtor spouse's financial circum-
stances, such as remarriage or an increase in salary, which suggest
that her support needs have decreased. 3 5 These courts will also
consider changes adversely affecting the debtor's ability to pay
such as a financial setback, the debtor's poor health, or the fact
that one of the children of the marriage has moved in with the
debtor.113 Similarly, courts following Calhoun may justify except-
ing divorce obligations from discharge by considering such factors
as the nondebtor spouse's current medical or financial problems,
the debtor's continued or increased earning ability, and the fact
that the debtor's bankruptcy will enable him to discharge substan-
tial debts unrelated to the divorce.1 37
Calhoun, however, represents the minority viewpoint.138 Most
courts, to the extent that they consider need and income at all in
resolving section 523(a)(5) issues, do not look beyond the financial
circumstances of the parties as they existed at the time of the di-
vorce.139 As a result, courts have applied section 523(a)(5) to ex-
cept divorce obligations from discharge despite evidence sug-
gesting a significant decrease in the nondebtor spouse's support
needs or in the debtor's ability to pay.140 This Article contends
alimony). Whether divorce obligations in the form of traditional alimony or child support
should always be excepted from discharge is discussed infra at notes 164-67 and accompa-
nying text.
135. E.g., In re Hysock, 75 Bankr. 113, 115 (Bankr. D. Del. 1987); In re Sullivan,
62 Bankr. 465, 468-69, 474 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1986).
136. E.g., Hysock, 75 Bankr. at 115; Sullivan, 62 Bankr. at 468-69, 474; In re Erler,
60 Bankr. 220, 223 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1986).
137. E.g., In re Costell, 75 Bankr. 348, 356 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987); In re Leupp,
73 Bankr. 33, 36-37 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987); In re Pitzen, 73 Bankr. 10, 13 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1986); In re Young, 72 Bankr. 450, 453 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1987); In re MacDonald, 69
Bankr. 259, 278 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986).
138. See Forsdick v. Turgeon, 812 F.2d 801, 803 (2d Cir. 1987); In re Bell, 61
Bankr. 171, 176 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986).
139. E.g., Boyle v. Donovan, 724 F.2d 681, 683 (8th Cir. 1984); In re Fryman, 67
Bankr. 112, 113-14 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1986); In re Gibson, 61 Bankr. 997, 999 (Bankr.
D.N.H. 1986); and cases cited infra note 140.
140. Forsdick v. Turgeon, 812 F.2d 801, 803-04 (2d Cir. 1987)(evidence that
nondebtor spouse no longer needed monthly support payments irrelevant); Draper v.
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that section 523(a)(5) authorizes courts to consider the financial
circumstances of the parties as they exist at the time of the sec-
tion 523(a)(5) trial and that the underlying policy goals of section
523(a)(5) are better served by such a consideration.
Courts have given more detailed explanations for not consid-
ering changed circumstances than they have for their adherence to
the other principles previously discussed in this Article. The pri-
mary justifications offered are that the language of section
523(a)(5) shows that Congress did not intend that there be an
inquiry into the parties' changed financial circumstances,' that
such an inquiry would "embroil federal courts in domestic rela-
tions matters which should properly be reserved to the state
courts,' 1 42 and that such an inquiry is unnecessary because a
modification of divorce obligations based on changed circum-
stances may be sought in state court under state law. 4 3 These
justifications will be addressed in sequence.
It has been argued that because Congress explicitly provided
that debts for educational loans are to be excepted from discharge
in section 523(a)(8) unless doing so "will impose an undue hard-
ship on the debtor,' ' 44 but failed to include similar language in
section 523(a)(5), there was no intent that present circumstances
be considered under section 523(a)(5).14 5 The omission from sec-
tion 523(a)(5) of the language found in section 523(a)(8), how-
ever, may instead have been due to Congress' tacit perception that
the question of whether a divorce obligation is in the nature of
Draper, 790 F.2d 52, 54 (8th Cir. 1986)(debtor's post-divorce financial problems and his
additional expenses resulting from his remarriage would not be considered in determining
the dischargeability of his divorce obligations); In re Harrell, 754 F.2d 902, 906-07 (11 th
Cir. 1985)(evidence that nondebtor spouse no longer needed support at time of bankruptcy
filing not relevant); In re Stone, 79 Bankr. 633, 639 (Bankr. D. Md. 1987)(see supra notes
16-17 and accompanying text); In re Graves, 69 Bankr. 626, 628-29 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1987); In re Levy, 63 Bankr. 449, 451 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1986)(debtor unemployed at time
of § 523(a)(5) trial due to economic slump of maritime industry); In re Bell, 61 Bankr.
171, 176 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986); In re Earl, 55 Bankr. 12, 14-15 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
1985).
141. Forsdick v. Turgeon, 812 F.2d at 804; In re Harrell, 754 F.2d at 906; In re
Stone, 79 Bankr. at 639.
142. Harrell, 754 F.2d at 907. See also Forsdick, 812 F.2d at 803-04; Stone, 79
Bankr. at 640.
143. Harrell, 754 F.2d at 907 n.8; In re Bell, 61 Bankr. 171, 176 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
1986); In re Fryman, 67 Bankr. 112, 113-14 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1986); In re Earl, 55
Bankr. 12, 15 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1985).
144. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (1986 & Supp. 1988).
145. Forsdick, 812 F.2d at 804; Stone, 79 Bankr. at 639.
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support may be determined by examining the parties' circum-
stances at the time of the section 523(a)(5) trial, whereas no such
flexibility exists under section 523(a)(8) in determining whether a
debt is for an educational loan - that fact has been established
long before the dischargeability hearing.
The verb tense employed in section 523(a)(5) suggests that
Congress did contemplate that bankruptcy courts would consider
the post-divorce circumstances of the parties. The statutory lan-
guage first excepts from discharge any debt for alimony, mainte-
nance, or support and then further provides that a liability desig-
nated as alimony, maintenance, or support is not to be excepted
from discharge unless it "is actually in the nature of alimony,
maintenance, or support."1 46 Had Congress intended the determi-
nation of the nature of a divorce obligation to be based solely on
circumstances existing at the time the obligation was created, it
likely would have stated that an obligation labelled as support is
not to be excepted from discharge unless it actually was in the
nature of support. Nothing in the language of section 523(a)(5)
mandates that bankruptcy courts ignore evidence of the current
circumstances of the parties in determining the dischargeability of
divorce obligations.
The argument that consideration of changed circumstances
would constitute an unwarranted intrusion by the federal courts
into the domain of state courts over matters of domestic relations
overlooks the fact that section 523(a)(5), if properly applied, re-
quires such an intervention in every case even when changed cir-
cumstances are not at issue. Intrusion into the realm of domestic
relations is unavoidable because the courts must balance the fed-
eral policy of providing debtors with a fresh start against the com-
peting concern that familial support obligations be fulfilled. 4
Bankruptcy courts must apply a federal standard to determine
whether divorce obligations created pursuant to state law are in
the nature of support so as to be nondischargeable. It has been
146. I U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)(1986 & Supp. 1988)(emphasis added).
147. "[A] state divorce decree, like other law governing the economic aspects of do-
mestic relations, must give way to clearly conflicting federal enactments." Ridgway v.
Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46, 55 (1981).
"While the intrusion of federal courts into the area of domestic relations law has been
historically limited, the economic aspects of domestic relations clearly come into play in a
bankruptcy case and call for the intervention of the bankruptcy court to pass upon the
dischargeability of marital-related obligations." In re Singer, 18 Bankr. 782, 784 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1982)(citing Ridgway), afd 787 F.2d 1033 (6th Cir. 1986).
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recognized that the resolution of a section 523(a)(5) issue necessi-
tates an examination of many of the same factors that the state
court relied upon in creating the original divorce obligation. 14 8
However, the state court decree is not controlling, both because a
separate federal standard must be applied under section 523(a)(5)
and because the labels used in divorce decrees and settlements fre-
quently do not accurately reflect whether a particular obligation
actually serves a support function. In effect, section 523(a)(5) re-
quires a de novo review of previously created divorce obligations
to determine whether they are in the nature of support.14 9 Such a
review should take into account all evidence, including the present
circumstances of the parties, which would assist the court in mak-
ing a decision which would best serve the underlying policy goals
of section 523(a)(5).
Some courts have justified their refusal to consider changed
circumstances by noting that modification of support awards may
be sought in state court.'5 0 However, the issue of whether a di-
vorce obligation is subject to discharge because it is not in the
nature of alimony under federal bankruptcy law presents a legal
question which is distinct from the issue of whether modification is
appropriate under state law. The inadequacy of state law modifi-
cation procedures as a substitute for a consideration of changed
circumstances under section 523(a)(5) is illustrated by the fact
that modification will sometimes be unavailable under state law
regardless of any changes that may have occurred in the financial
circumstances of the parties. For instance, in In re Stone,'' the
148. In re Yeates, 807 F.2d 874, 878 (10th Cir. 1986); In re Calhoun, 715 F.2d
1103, 1108-10 (6th Cir. 1983).
149. Contrary to the position taken by this Article, the Eleventh Circuit, while ac-
knowledging that state law is not controlling on § 523(a)(5) issues, has held that §
523(a)(5) requires only a simple and imprecise examination of the parties' circumstances
at the time of the divorce:
We conclude that Congress intended that bankruptcy courts make only a simple
inquiry into whether or not the obligation at issue is in the nature of support.
This inquiry will usually take the form of deciding whether the obligation was in
the nature of support as opposed to being in the nature of a property settlement.
Thus, there will be no necessity for a precise investigation of the spouse's cir-
cumstances to determine the appropriate level of need or support. It will not be
relevant that the circumstances of the parties may have changed . . ..
In re Harrell, 754 F.2d 902, 907 (1 1th Cir. 1985). Given the varied forms that support
obligations may take, it is not clear how the question of whether an obligation is in the
nature of support is to be simply determined without a precise investigation.
150. See supra note 143.
151. 79 Bankr. 633 (Bankr. D. Md. 1987) (discussed in detail supra notes 16-17 and
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debtor, who had suffered a "severe financial setback" after his
marital separation, was denied a reduction in state court of his
obligation to pay his former wife $84,000 per year because of a
nonmodification provision in the separation agreement. 152 The
bankruptcy court in Stone quoted with approval a recent Second
Circuit holding that changed circumstances are irrelevant to the
section 523(a)(5) analysis, despite the unavailability of state law
relief for the debtor, "because the decision not to make modifica-
tion available to the obligated spouse reflects a state-made policy
decision in the area of domestic relations, an area into which we
are loath to intrude. 1 5 3 This undue deference 54 to state law in
the face of a competing federal interest sacrifices the federal pol-
icy of providing bankruptcy debtors with a fresh start.
An inquiry into changed circumstances under section
523(a)(5) is appropriate whether or not modification of the di-
vorce obligation can be sought in state court. 5 When a bank-
accompanying text). Other cases in which it appears that the debtor was precluded from
obtaining a downward modification of some or all of his divorce obligations in state court
no matter what changes had occurred in the parties' financial conditions include Draper v.
Draper, 790 F.2d 52 (8th Cir. 1986) and In re Patalano, 68 Bankr. 30 (Bankr. D.R.I.
1986).
152. Stone, 79 Bankr. at 634.
153. Id. at 643 (quoting Forsdick v. Turgeon, 812 F.2d 801, 804 (2d Cir. 1987)).
154. This deference may be motivated in large part by a reluctance on the part of
bankruptcy courts to act as a "super divorce" court, Calhoun, 715 F.2d 1103, 1110 n.12
(6th Cir. 1983), and thereby be forced to make the sorts of factual determinations typically
involved in the establishment of an original divorce obligation. In In re Stone, 79 Bankr. at
643 n.2, the court expressed concern that a consideration of changed circumstances under §
523(a)(5) would require the court to exercise continuing jurisdiction to consider allegations
of additional changed circumstances subsequent to the initial § 523(a)(5) trial. See also In
re Levy, 63 Bankr. 449, 451 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1986). One response to this concern, which
apparently has not proven to be a significant problem to those courts which do consider
changed circumstances, would be for federal courts to abstain from hearing repeated §
523(a)(5) complaints based on changed circumstances and defer to the greater expertise of
state courts in domestic affairs. See infra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
155. It is well established that a pre-bankruptcy agreement to waive the fresh start
benefits of a bankruptcy discharge is void as against public policy. In re Phillips, 80 Bankr.
484, 486 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987); In re Markizer, 66 Bankr. 1014, 1018 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 1986). This principle has been cited by courts which have ignored provisions in divorce
settlements stating that certain obligations would not be dischargeable in bankruptcy and
have made independent determinations under § 523(a)(5) of whether the obligations in
question were in the nature of support. In re Phillips, 80 Bankr. at 484; In re Markizer, 66
Bankr. at 1018. It can be argued that a bankruptcy court's refusal to consider changed
circumstances in determining whether an obligation is actually serving a support function
under § 523(a)(5), when coupled with the unavailability of modification of the obligation
under state law because of a waiver of modification rights in a divorce settlement, has the
practical consequence of giving effect to an indirect waiver of discharge.
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ruptcy court discharges a divorce obligation based on evidence
that the debtor no longer has the ability to pay that obligation or
that the nondebtor spouse no longer needs that obligation to be
fulfilled, it is merely exercising its customary authority to dis-
charge debts in order to implement the federal "fresh start" pol-
icy. Conversely, when it considers an increase in the nondebtor
spouse's needs or the debtor's ability to pay in holding a divorce
obligation to be nondischargeable, it is merely leaving undisturbed
an obligation which was either imposed upon or agreed to by the
debtor in accordance with state law.'56 Under either of these sce-
narios, the consideration of changed circumstances will facilitate
the implementation of the policy goals behind section 523(a)(5).
III. A PROPOSED STANDARD
It is easier to criticize the principles currently relied upon by
many courts in resolving section 523(a)(5) issues than it is to ar-
ticulate a sound and precise test for resolving those issues.15 7 In
attempting to set forth a clear and proper standard for determin-
ing whether a debt arising from a marital separation constitutes
alimony, maintenance, or support under section 523(a)(5), one
156. In considering changed circumstances, courts should distinguish between di-
vorce obligations which are past due and those which will be coming due in the future. A
debtor should not be able to escape liability on unpaid past due obligations merely because
his ability to pay or the nondebtor spouse's needs decreased after the arrearage was cre-
ated. See In re Rowles, 66 Bankr. 628, 631 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986). "The dis-
chargeability of. . . unpaid past liabilities requires an analysis distinct from consideration
of whether the continuing obligation . . . may be discharged." In re Calhoun, 715 F.2d at
1109 n.9. With respect to arrearages on divorce obligations, courts should focus on the
financial circumstances of the parties as they existed at the time the obligation became
due.
The fact that a divorce obligation is excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(5) would
not preclude the debtor from subsequently seeking a downward modification of that obliga-
tion in state court based upon state law. While the bankruptcy court is empowered to
either discharge or except from discharge divorce obligations, it has no authority to estab-
lish those obligations or to require their continuance. However, to the extent that a bank-
ruptcy court discharged a divorce obligation based upon changed circumstances, it would
be in contravention of the bankruptcy court's authority to discharge debts for the state
court to reinstate that obligation unless there was a showing of additional changed circum-
stances subsequent to the § 523(a)(5) trial.
157. Perhaps no apology is needed for an inability to propose an "easy" formula for
resolving § 523(a)(5) issues since state courts acknowledge that "the rules for determining
alimony or division of property in an action for dissolution of marriage provide no mathe-
matical formula by which such awards can be precisely determined." Rezac v. Rezac, 221
Neb. 516, 517, 378 N.W.2d 196, 197 (1985). See also Gray v. Gray, 451 So. 2d 579, 586
(La. Ct. App. 1984).
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should keep in mind Congress' intent in enacting that section.
That intent was to strike a proper balance between the competing
policies of giving a bankruptcy debtor a fresh start and requiring
that the debtor's obligations to provide for his former spouse and
children be fulfilled.
The first step in attempting to create a new standard for ad-
dressing these issues is to repudiate the five principles outlined in
the previous section of this Article. The underlying purposes of
section 523(a)(5) are not served by a standard which draws a line
between traditional alimony obligations and divisions of marital
assets and debts. All of a debtor's divorce obligations, if fulfilled,
contribute to the welfare of the debtor's former spouse and chil-
dren even if the obligations represent a division of the marital es-
tate.15 In fact, it may be necessary that the division of the marital
property be carried out in order for the most basic needs of the
former spouse and children to be met. Conversely, any divorce ob-
ligation which a bankruptcy debtor is required to fulfill hinders his
fresh start even if the obligation is in the form of traditional sup-
port. Therefore, the federal definition of alimony, maintenance,
and support for purposes of section 523(a)(5) should not be tied to
state law distinctions between marital property divisions and more
traditional alimony or support obligations. The form that a partic-
ular divorce obligation takes should not be determinative of its
dischargeability. Additionally, in order to facilitate the policy
goals of section 523(a)(5), courts should focus on the function be-
ing served by the obligation in question, rather than on the inten-
tion of the parties or the divorce court in creating it. Finally, a
willingness to consider the circumstances of the parties as they
exist at the time of the section 523(a)(5) trial will advance the
goal of striking a proper balance between the competing policy
concerns of section 523(a)(5).
After the faulty premises addressed in this Article have been
cast aside, the question remains as to the appropriate definition of
alimony, maintenance, and support for purposes of section
523(a)(5). There are many possible meanings which can be given
those terms, but little guidance is provided by the statute.159
158. See In re Calhoun, 715 F.2d 1103, 1108 (6th Cir. 1983).
159. In view of this lack of guidance, it is not surprising that courts appear to differ
on the standard of living which should be encompassed in the federal definition of support.
In Boyle v. Donovan, 724 F.2d 681, 683 (8th Cir. 1984), the debtor's obligation to pay the
expenses for each of his children to obtain a "post-graduate professional degree" was held
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Alimony, maintenance, and support under section 523(a)(5)
could be defined narrowly as including only those obligations
which must be fulfilled in order to insure that the minimum food,
clothing, and shelter needs of the debtor's former spouse and chil-
dren are met, no matter what standard of living was enjoyed dur-
ing the marriage.160 Such an approach, however, would be giving
too little weight to the interests of the debtor's former spouse and
children. The bankruptcy laws should not be a tool which enables
a debtor to force his former spouse and children into a spartan
standard of living when the debtor could provide a higher stan-
dard without undue hardship. 6'
On the other hand, section 523(a)(5) could be construed as
automatically excepting from discharge all divorce obligations
which are needed to maintain the nondebtor spouse and children
at the standard of living to which they had become accustomed
during the marriage, no matter how extravagant. The "fresh
start" policy of the Bankruptcy Code would be slighted, however,
if a debtor is not relieved of the obligation to maintain the
to be nondischargeable because the "debtor's plea for a fresh start must give way before
the rights he recognized to provide his children with a start in life comparable to that
which he enjoyed." See also In re Goin, 808 F.2d 1391 (10th Cir. 1987)(affirming a hold-
ing that the debtor's obligation to pay his former spouse $80,000 over sixteen years was
nondischargeable because the $350 monthly child support payments were not sufficient to
provide the debtor's former family with the standard of living to which they had grown
accustomed). A debtor's obligation to assume debts on a BMW automobile awarded to his
former spouse has been held to be nondischargeable, In re Graves, 69 Bankr. 626 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1987), as has a debtor's obligation to pay for any reasonable orthodontic expenses
for his children which might arise. In re Spurgeon, 80 Bankr. 477 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
1986).
On the other hand, it has been stated that, although the living standards of the parties
should be taken into account, bankruptcy courts should not "force the perpetuation of an
artificially grand life style." In re Helm, 48 Bankr. 215, 224 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985). An
obligation to pay private school tuition for the debtor's children has been discharged as a
"luxury" not in the nature of support. In re Sullivan, 62 Bankr. 465, 471 (Bankr. N.D.
Miss. 1986). A debtor's obligation to make monthly mortgage payments of $420 on the
marital residence which had been awarded to his former spouse was held to be dischargea-
ble in view of the debtor's monthly alimony and child support obligation of $1,900, despite
the fact that the debtor was a practicing physician and the nondebtor spouse spoke little
English, had no work experience in the United States, and had been awarded custody of
the couple's three children. In re Grijalva, 72 Bankr. 334 (S.D. W. Va. 1987).
160. The word "alimony" comes from Latin "alimonia," meaning sustenance.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 67 (5th ed. 1979).
161. In some bankruptcy cases, virtually all the debts which the debtor seeks to dis-
charge arose from the divorce. E.g., In re Mallisk, 64 Bankr. 39 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986)
(the debtor agreed to pay his former spouse approximately $50,000 over ten years, and
subsequently filed a chapter 7 petition in which he listed total debts of $37,172, of which
$35,576 were for the debtor's divorce obligations).
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nondebtor spouse's lavish lifestyle even if he is unable to do so
without extreme hardship.
These rather extreme approaches define support based solely
on what is needed to provide a minimum or accustomed level of
support for the nondebtor spouse and children. However, the un-
derlying policy goals of section 523(a)(5) would be better served if
support were defined as being a function of needs, income level,
and the future earning potential of both the debtor and the
nondebtor spouse. Therefore, it is recommended that courts deter-
mine whether a divorce obligation constitutes nondischargeable
support by weighing the interest of the debtor's former spouse and
children in having the obligation fulfilled against the hardship that
would result for the debtor if the obligation were not dis-
charged. 6 2 In other words, the greater the need of the nondebtor
spouse for a divorce obligation to be fulfilled, the greater the hard-
ship should be to the debtor as a result of a ruling of nondis-
chargeability in order for that obligation to be discharged.16 8
162. The Sixth Circuit, in In re Calhoun, 715 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir. 1983), has set
forth a test which is similar to this proposed standard. It provides that an obligation quali-
fies for the exception to discharge only if the obligation has the effect of providing neces-
sary support and if the obligation is not manifestly unreasonable in view of the debtor's
ability to pay. Id. at 1109-10. "Necessary" support has apparently been interpreted by
courts applying Calhoun as being at least partially a function of the debtor's income. See,
e.g., In re MacDonald, 69 Bankr. 259, 277-78 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986); In re Brock, 58
Bankr. 797, 809 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1986). Therefore, Calhoun represents a balancing test
of the sort urged here.
However, the Calhoun test also includes an ill-advised threshold requirement for
nondischargeability that there have been an intent to create a support obligation by the
parties or the court issuing the divorce decree. Calhoun, 715 F.2d at 1109. Although Cal-
houn suggests that intent may be determined by focusing on the needs and incomes of the
parties, id. at 1108-09, an approach which will generally lead to sound results, see supra
notes 84-85 and accompanying text, its intent test is also subject to misapplication and
should be eliminated. See supra notes 87-104 and accompanying text.
Other courts appear to apply a balancing test of the sort proposed here without articu-
lating it in as much detail as the Calhoun court. E.g., In re Patalano, 68 Bankr. 30 (Bankr.
D.R.I. 1986); In re Anderson, 62 Bankr. 448 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986).
163. An alternative standard would be to provide for an automatic exception from
discharge for all divorce obligations needed by the nondebtor spouse and children for a
sustenance level of support and then to apply a balancing test to determine the dis-
chargeability of all obligations above that minimum level. It is questionable, however,
whether even a bare minimum level of support should automatically be excepted from dis-
charge. If, for instance, the parties had incurred substantial joint debts prior to the divorce,
it may unduly sacrifice the debtor's fresh start to require him to fulfill an obligation to
assume those debts even if the assumption is needed to provide a minimum level of support.
Under such circumstances, the "hold harmless" obligation should be discharged and the
nondebtor spouse left to file her own petition under the Bankruptcy Code.
Outside of this situation, the discharge of a divorce obligation which is needed for a
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However, even a divorce obligation which would be needed by the
nondebtor spouse for luxuries, rather than necessities, could be ex-
cepted from discharge if the debtor could fulfill the obligation
with relatively little hardship.
All divorce obligations should be subject to this balancing
test, even those which are in the form of "traditional" support
obligations such as modifiable periodic payments which terminate
upon the death or remarriage of the recipient spouse. Although
some courts indicate that such obligations should always be ex-
cepted from discharge,"" it is contended here that such an ap-
proach is inconsistent with Congress' "intent that considerations
particular to federal bankruptcy law shall be determinative of dis-
chargeability issues."' 65 For example, in In re Sullivan,'66 a
debtor had agreed to a traditional monthly child support obliga-
tion which exceeded his monthly income. The bankruptcy court
properly indicated its willingness to discharge that portion of the
obligation which was unreasonable in view of the "fresh start"
policy of the bankruptcy law. 6 7 Although it is less likely in a con-
tested case that a state court would create a traditional support
obligation which was unreasonably excessive, even such a court
imposed obligation should be scrutinized to determine if it is in
the nature of support under the federal standard.
Courts applying the standard proposed in this Article to de-
termine nondischargeability under section 523(a)(5) would focus
on the relative needs and earning powers of the parties, much as
sustenance level of support should be a rare occurrence. But if a divorce obligation had
been agreed to or imposed upon the debtor which is beyond the debtor's present or foresee-
able ability to pay, that obligation should be subject to discharge even if it is needed to
maintain the nondebtor spouse at a minimum support level. See, e.g., In re Sullivan, 62
Bankr. 465, 472-74 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1986) (the debtor had agreed to make monthly
child support payments of $1,350, which the court assumed was necessary for the chil-
dren's support, but which also exceeded the debtor's monthly income during his most pro-
ductive years). This is not to suggest that obligations needed for the nondebtor spouse's
sustenance should not ordinarily be excepted from discharge; however, a divorce obligation
should not be excepted from discharge to the extent that it provides a higher standard of
living than the nondebtor spouse could reasonably expect to receive had the marriage con-
tinued. Contra Scheible, supra note 68, at 53 (taking the position that a divorce debt
should never be discharged if doing so would leave the nondebtor spouse unable to meet her
basic needs).
164. See, e.g., Forsdick v. Turgeon, 812 F.2d 801, 802 (2d Cir. 1987); In re Harrell,
754 F.2d 902, 906 (11th Cir. 1985); In re Rowles, 66 Bankr. 628, 631 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1986); In re Deatherage, 55 Bankr. 268, 271 n.3 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1985).
165. In re Calhoun, 715 F.2d 1103, 1108 n.6 (6th Cir. 1983).
166. 62 Bankr. 465, 473 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1986).
167. Id. at 472-74.
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state courts do in establishing or modifying the original divorce
obligation."' 8 Although the original divorce decree cannot be de-
terminative of section 523(a)(5) issues, federal bankruptcy and
district courts should consider adopting a policy of abstaining
from deciding section 523(a)(5) issues and allowing them to be
heard in state court.1 9 The advantage of an abstention policy is
that the assessment of the relative needs and earning powers of
the parties would be performed by state courts which have much
more expertise in undertaking this sort of analysis.
The danger of abstention is that the "fresh start" policy un-
derlying the Bankruptcy Code might be given too little weight by
state courts applying section 523(a)(5). 170 This concern might be
alleviated if the federal courts clearly articulated what factors
should be considered in resolving section 523(a)(5) issues and,
perhaps more importantly, what factors should not be considered.
Because the proper resolution of section 523(a)(5) issues essen-
tially boils down to an equitable determination based upon the
168. Courts assessing these factors under § 523(a)(5) will face many of the difficult
questions encountered by state courts such as the effect of a debtor's decision to remarry,
to go back to school, or to make a career change which will result in a reduction of income.
Similar issues will arise with respect to the nondebtor spouse's post-divorce way of life. See,
e.g., 2 H. CLARK, supra note 55, § 17.6, at 279-94 (explaining the factors used by courts
when alimony is modified). In deciding what, if any, portion of a divorce obligation should
be discharged, the court may consider whether the debtor has been making a good faith
effort to fulfill the obligation. See, e.g., In re Sullivan, 65 Bankr. 465, 473-74 (Bankr. N.D.
Miss. 1986).
169. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) (1986) authorizes federal district courts to abstain from
hearing a proceeding arising under the Bankruptcy Code in the interest of justice or in the
interest of comity with state courts. Although a bankruptcy court does not have indepen-
dent authority to abstain, it is authorized to recommend that the district court order ab-
stention of a proceeding which is pending in the bankruptcy court. See Bankruptcy Rule
5011(b) (1987).
Abstention under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) is most appropriate when another court tra-
ditionally decides the same issues as those before the abstaining court. This is especially
true if the issue is one which requires a particular expertise which the bankruptcy court
does not have. In re Heslar, 16 Bankr. 329, 332 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1981). Because state
courts handle divorces on a daily basis, "'[i]n no other field does abstention better serve
the interests of the parties and other interested persons than in that of domestic relations
law.'" In re Smith, 81 Bankr. 888, 893 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1988) (quoting Heslar, 16
Bankr. at 333). Despite this language, only one recently published decision has been found
in which a federal court abstained from hearing a § 523(a)(5) issue, and in that case a
state court action to determine the dischargeability of the divorce obligation was already
pending when the federal court abstained. In re Taylor, 49 Bankr. 416 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
1985).
170. This danger is compounded by the fact that the only federal appellate review of
state court judgments determining § 523(a)(5) issues would be by writ of certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3)(1986).
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needs and incomes of the respective parties, state courts, which
frequently make similar determinations in issuing divorce decrees,
may very well be the most appropriate forum for litigating section
523(a)(5) issues.
CONCLUSION
Whether an obligation arising from a marital separation con-
stitutes alimony, maintenance, or support so as to be nondis-
chargeable should be determined by weighing the interest of the
nondebtor spouse in having the obligation fulfilled against the
hardship that would result to the debtor if the obligation were not
discharged. In weighing these competing interests, courts should
focus on the needs and earning power of both the debtor and the
nondebtor spouse. Although this standard is obviously imprecise,
it is markedly superior to an approach which relies on criteria
which may be more definite, but which bear little relation to the
underlying purposes of section 523(a)(5).
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